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DURING THE PAST DECADE, the behavior of international capital flows, 
current account balances, and exchange rates have puzzled economists 
and preoccupied policymakers. The period has been marked by widely 
fluctuating exchange rates, huge OPEC surpluses, burgeoning debt of less 
developed countries (LDCs)  and unprecedented current account deficits 
in many developed countries. The nature, direction, and scope of inter- 
national borrowing have  also  shifted dramatically. The  proportion of 
private to official capital inflows to LDCs has grown substantially; the 
international money market has expanded dramatically; and capital con- 
trols have been liberalized in many economies. 
The need for analysis is greatest on two sets of questions. First, what 
factors have determined the size and direction of current account imbal- 
ances in recent years? Second, what has been the relation between the 
current account and movements in the exchange rate? Answers to  the 
first question have tended to focus  on  OPEC price increases and sur- 
pluses. Observing that the large surpluses must be balanced in the aggre- 
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gate by the deficits of oil-importing countries, many analysts have attrib- 
uted the current account difficulties of individual countries to  their oil 
imports and have regarded reduction of those imports as a major policy 
objective. For example, in discussing the worsening U.S. current account 
deficit in 1977, Paul Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve, stressed: 
"Oil imports have increased by nearly $20 billion in the past two years 
alone, directly accounting for about half of the reversal in our trade from 
a surplus of $9 billion to a deficit of $30 billion....  Given the burden of 
the oil imports on our external payments, to maintain that confidence [in 
our financial policy] it is particularly important that we can point to the 
prospect over time, not of inexorable increases in our oil imports but of a 
decline."1 
McKinnon has taken a different view:  "rationalization of American 
energy policy  would  probably reduce imports of  fossil  fuels  into  the 
United States, but would be offset elsewhere as long as America is de- 
ficient in saving [or booming in investment]. The microeconomic details 
of trade in this or that commodity are dominated by broad investment- 
savings  considerations-unlike  current heated  political  discussions  of 
these issues would suggest."2 One aim of this paper is to evaluate these 
contrasting positions. Although there is some evidence of links between 
current account deficits and oil import dependence in cross-country data, 
these connections tend to hold only in the short run, and they disappear 
a few years after the  1973  oil price increase. Moreover, differences in 
investment activity among countries are found to be at least as important 
as oil dependence in explaining current account experiences since 1973. 
McKinnon's position is vindicated as a proposition describing events over 
a period of several years. 
On the second question, at a theoretical level almost any combination 
of deficits or surpluses, appreciation or depreciation, is possible, depend- 
1. Paul A. Volcker, "The Challenges of International  Economic Policy," Quar- 
terly Review  of  the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York, vol. 2 (Winter 1977-78), 
pp. 3-4. As Stanley Fischer points out in his discussion of this paper, Volcker indi- 
cates that oil dependence  does not provide a complete explanation  of recent current 
account movements and cites the example of Japan in support  of his argument. 
2.  Ronald I.  McKinnon, "Exchange-Rate Instability, Trade Imbalances, and 
Monetary  Policies in Japan and the United States,"  in Peter Oppenheimer,  ed., Issues 
in International  Economics  (Stocksfield, England: Orill Press Ltd., 1980), p. 237. 
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ing on  the underlying exogenous  disturbances affecting the  economic 
system. Only when a specific set of factors can be identified as a dominant 
influence on the current account can a determinate relation be predicted 
between deficits and the exchange rate. 
This paper focuses  on the determinants of current account balances 
and exchange rates in the intermediate run. With this horizon in mind, 
the analysis assumes that output levels  are supply-determined and not 
affected by aggregate demand; real interest rates are tied to the marginal 
productivity of capital and are not influenced by monetary policies, and 
frictions in adjusting to shocks are unimportant. These presumptions still 
permit a variety of responses, depending on the nature of shocks to the 
system and whether they are perceived as temporary or permanent. De- 
partures of  the economy from its supply-constrained path-caused  by 
demand variations or slow adjustment  to shocks-are  not part of the main 
analysis, although they are considered as amendments to the model and 
are allowed for in some of the empirical tests. 
The paper emphasizes the importance of fixed investment to macro- 
economic performance. It shows theoretically how a rise in investment 
enlarges the current account deficit and raises the real exchange rate. 
And it presents empirical evidence that variations in investment demand 
have dominated the medium-run behavior of current accounts and ex- 
change rates in the 1970s. 
Overview of the Current  Account in the 1970s 
Tables 1 through 5 indicate the huge changes in world trade and cur- 
rent account flows in the 1970s.  The tables illustrate the size of overall 
current account imbalances for various regions, the magnitudes of these 
imbalances relative to gross national products, and the role of oil imports 
in the global shifts of the current account. Table  1 presents both con- 
ventional and adjusted measures of  the current account. The  adjusted 
measures correct for distortions in the accounts caused by inflation. The 
current account measures the net trade of goods and services plus trans- 
fers plus the net investment income from abroad. When the foreign in- 
vestment is in nonindexed interest-bearing assets such as bank loans or 
bonds, inflation distorts the measurement of the investment income. The 
conventional current account records the interest payments received by Nt 
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Table 2.  Bilateral Trade Flows between Major Regions,  1972-77a 
Billions of U.S.  dollars 
Flows  by region  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977 
Developed  countries 
Exports to 
Nonoil  LDCs  41.8  57.5  84.8  90.9  92.4  105.2 
OPEC  11.7  16.3  29.0  47.5  54.8  67.7 
Trade balance with 
Nonoil  LDCs  9.2  10.3  16.9  26.7  11.5  12.9 
OPEC  -11.5  -18.0  -67.8  -36.4  -46.7  -45.1 
Nonoil  LDCs 
Exports to 
Developed  countries  32.6  47.1  67.8  64.1  80.9  92.3 
OPEC  1.4  2.4  4.7  5.8  6.5  9.0 
Trade balance with 
Developed  countries  -9.2  -10.3  -16.9  -26.7  -11.5  -12.9 
OPEC  -3.7  -4.6  -19.3  -17.7  -21.5  -22.2 
OPEC 
Exports to 
Developed  countries  23.2  34.3  96.8  83.8  101.5  112.7 
Nonoil  LDCs  5.1  6.9  24.0  23.5  28.1  31.2 
Trade balance with 
Developed  countries  11.5  18.0  67.8  36.4  46.7  45.1 
Nonoil  LDCs  3.7  4.6  19.3  17.7  21.5  22.2 
Sources: United Nations,  Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, vol. 29 (July 1975), p. 24 and vol. 33 (May 
1979), p. 32. 
a.  The classification of  countries follows  the  United Nations Standard Country Code, annex 2,  Sta- 
tistical Papers, Series M, no. 49, 1970. 
creditors but not the real capital losses  (or the capital gains of debtors) 
due to inflation. A  rise in inflation that is exactly matched by a rise in 
interest rates causes a rise in interest income for a creditor country that 
is exactly offset by greater capital losses. Since only the increased interest 
income is recorded in the current account, the measured current account 
surplus rises. Conversely, debtor countries show a lower current account 
balance under inflationary conditions than they would with stable prices 
because the accounts do not show their real gain on outstanding debt. 
In table  1 the real capital gains and losses  on outstanding interest- 
bearing assets have been added to the conventionally measured current 
account for each region. The adjustments are important because interest 
payments of the LDCs  constitute a large part of their current account 
deficits, as shown in the addenda at the bottom of table 1. Similar calcu- Jefirey D. Sachs  207 
Table 3. Oil Imports  and  the Current  Account  as a Percentage  of Gross  National 
Product,  Developed  Countries,  Selected  Periods,  1968-79 
Oil imports  as a  Current  account  as a 
percent  of GNP  percent  of GNP 
(Moil/GNP)  (CA/GNP)  A(CA/GNP)  Conntry 
(percentage  rank  by 
Countrya  1968-73 1974-79  1968-73  1974-79  points)  A(CA/GNP) 
Finland  2.8  5.5  -1.2  -2.7  -1.5  9 
Belgium  2.5  4.2  2.5  -0.4  -2.9  3 
Denmark  2.4  4.3  -2.1  -3.3  -1.2  10 
Sweden  2.0  4.2  0.3  -1.6  -1.9  5 
Japan  1.9  4.6  1.3  0.3  -1.0  6-8 
Norway  1.9  -1.4  -1.0  -8.0  -7.0  1 
United Kingdom  1.7  2.6  0.4  -1.2  -1.6  6-8 
Italy  1.6  4.4  1.4  -0.2  -1.6  6-8 
France  1.4  3.4  -0.3  -0.6  -0.9  11 
Austria  1.4  2.9  2.5  -0.4  -2.9  2 
Germany  1.0  2.7  1.0  1.0  0.0  13-14 
Netherlands  0.8  0.6  0.9  1.1  0.2  15 
United States  0.2  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  13-14 
Australia  0.0  -0.4  -1.7  -2.3  -0.6  12 
Canada  -0.3  -0.8  0.0  -2.0  -2.0  4 
Sources: Net  oil imports-Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and Development, Foreign Trade 
Statistics, Series A,  various issues; current account-OECD,  Main Econiomic  Indicators, various issues 
GNP-OECD,  National  Accounts  of  OECD  Countries,  1950-78  (Paris:  OECD,  1980),  vol.  1 and  recent 
supplements. 
a.  Countries are arranged by rank of oil dependence in 1968-73. 
lations are made for four developed economies in the appendix. These 
calculations show that the U.S.  current account deficits in recent years 
have been overstated by about $1 billion because of the inflation bias. 
The patterns in the current accounts displayed in tables 1 through 5 
can be roughly summarized. In the early  1970s  the nonoil  LDCs  had 
modest current account deficits that were approximately matched by sur- 
pluses of  developed  countries; OPEC's small deficits before  1970  be- 
came small surpluses during 1970-72.  (The sum of the current account 
deficits of  OPEC,  the developed  countries, and the LCDs  is  not  zero 
because of the exclusion of some groups of countries such as the mem- 
bers of Comecon, errors and omissions, and asymmetries among nations 
in balance-of-payments accounting techniques and timing.) The 1973-74 
rise in oil prices contributed to an enormous OPEC surplus matched by 
unprecedented deficits in the developed countries and larger deficits in 
the LDCs. During the 1975-78  period the OPEC surplus was reduced as 208  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Table 4.  Current Account as a Percentage of Gross Domestic  Product, Nonoil LDCs, 
1973-79 
Category  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
Net  oil-importing 
countries  -1.9  -5.4  -5.7  -3.7  -2.8  -3.1  -4.0 
Net  oil-exporting 
countriesa  -2.9  -4.4  -7.1  -4.9  -4.4  -4.2  -3.3 
All nonoil  LDCs  -2.0  -5.2  -6.0  - 3.9  -3.0  - 3.2  -4.0 
Source:  IMF  Annual  Report,  1980,  table  9,  p.  30. 
a.  Bahrain, Bolivia, the Congo,  Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon,  Malaysia, Mexico,  Peru, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Trinidad, Tobago, and Tunisia. 
exports to OPEC expanded considerably. During this period the adjust- 
ment for inflation is crucial; by  1978  over half  of  the  apparent LDC 
deficit is  attributable to  the  inflation bias.  In  that year  the published 
OPEC current account showed approximate balance but in fact indicates 
a significant deficit when adjusted for the capital losses on OPEC finan- 
cial claims relative to the rest of the world. In 1979 and 1980 the second 
oil shock occurred, and OPEC surpluses again rose sharply. Data limita- 
tions prevent the calculation of ratios of the current account to income 
in 1980 for the developed countries and the nonoil LDCs. 
There is a dramatic difference between the current account experience 
of LDCs and developed countries during 1974-77,  even though their oil- 
import dependence is comparable. The ratio of the current account deficit 
to  GNP  rose  much more for  the  LDCs  than for  developed  countries 
(see table 5).  In 1978 both groups appear to have returned to the ratios 
that prevailed before the oil  shocks once  the inflation adjustments are 
made. The large LDC deficits resulted in a significant jump in the net 
debt of  the LDCs-defined  as gross debt minus foreign exchange  re- 
serves-as  a percentage of  the gross national  products of  the  LDCs, 
shown in the next to last row of table 1. Again in 1979 and 1980, enor- 
mous  current account deficits resulted in  a  sharp rise in  the debts of 
LDCs.  The ratio of LDC  debt to income leveled  off in  1979,  but un- 
doubtedly rose again in 1980. 
An important question addressed in tables 3 to 5 is to what extent the 
relative dependence on oil imports explains movements in the current ac- 
count for the LDCs and the developed countries. The conventional view 
holds that deficits increase most in economies that are heavily dependent cd 
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on oil imports and least in the self-sufficient economies. The analysis be- 
low suggests a different outcome if the oil price increase is perceived as 
permanent. In that case, differential dependence on oil imports will have 
little effect on the relative current account position. If the shock is per- 
ceived as temporary, however, the conventional view is correct. Market 
expectations of the permanence of an oil shock cannot be reconstructed, 
and no doubt initially there was certainly a wide dispersion of expecta- 
tions. It is assumed that by 1975 the predominant expectation was that 
the higher relative price would be maintained, and that this expectation 
prevailed until the second big price increase that followed  the Iranian 
revolution. These assumptions correspond to what actually happened to 
prices.3 
The data in tables 3 and 4 do not suggest a simple correlation between 
oil dependence and current account deficits. Among the nonoil LDCs the 
deficit-to-GNP ratio for net oil exporters rose by more in the years be- 
tween 1973 and 1978 than the ratio for net oil importers! (Unlike other 
measures of the current account in this paper, table 4 excludes official 
transfers.)  The correlation between high deficits and large oil  imports 
holds only for the years of major price rises (1974  and 1979).  Quite simi- 
lar results are evident for the developed economies. A strong negative re- 
lation between the ratio of current account to GNP after 1973, CA/GNP, 
and the ratio of oil imports to GNP, Moil/GNP,  does not hold because 
the largest oil exporters, Norway and Canada, have the first and fourth 
largest declines in CA/GNP,  respectively, after 1973.  One can exclude 
the net oil exporters (defined as countries with net oil exports in some 
year during the 1968-79  period, including Australia, Canada, Norway, 
and the United Kingdom, the last of which is self-sufficient), and as con- 
ventionally  expected,  the  change in  the  current account,  measured as 
[(CA/GNP)7479  -  (CA/GNP)  68-73],  is negatively correlated to the pre- 
1973 ratio, Moil/GNP,  with r =  -0.70.  However, this relation seems to 
derive from the years just after the oil price increase. The correlation of 
[(CA/GNP)76-78  -  (CA/GNP)68-73]  with  pre-1973  oil  dependence, 
3. The real price of Saudi petroleum exports in terms of export prices of the in- 
dustrial  countries  almost tripled  between 1973 and 1974, stayed at the higher plateau 
in 1974-78, and then jumped again. See International  Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics, various issues, series 76aad for Saudi Arabia and 74d for all 
industrial  countries. Je0frey D. Sachs  211 
(Moit/GNP)68-73,  is-0.26,  and the correlation with ex post oil depen- 
dence, (Moil/GNP)  76-78,  is only -0.085. 
The large deficits of the oil exporters provide the most graphic illus- 
tration of a major theme developed below-in  a world of  capital mo- 
bility, shifts in investment opportunities lead to corresponding shifts in 
the current account. Higher oil prices may have forced countries to run 
deficits and borrow from  abroad  (incurring current account  deficits) 
because  of  the  short-run difficulty of  adjusting consumption  to  lower 
income, but deficits also reflect borrowing to exploit new investment op- 
portunities such as development of indigenous energy supplies. 
If one accepts this analysis, two features must be explained concerning 
the direction and size of current account flows: the sharp increase in the 
LDC deficits (and corresponding debt)  in the  1970s,  which cannot be 
attributed simply to heavy oil import dependence, and the distribution of 
deficits within the groups of LDCs and developed countries. 
Analysis  of  these  issues  will  help  illuminate  the  relation  between 
deficits and the exchange rate. Below I examine how strong the overall 
link has been between the current account and the exchange rate in the 
period of floating exchange rates. I also present empirical evidence for 
the mechanism suggested by several analysts who have stressed shocks to 
the real exchange rates as an important source of nominal exchange rate 
fluctuations.4 According to this view,  the current account balance  and 
exchange rate can move  together if both  are related to  shocks  to  the 
equilibrium real exchange rate. Since I will argue that one important type 
of real shock has been shifts in expectations about the returns to invest- 
ment, I describe how the resulting shifts in investment may contribute to 
changes in the nominal and real exchange rates and show how they may 
provide a link between the current account and the real exchange rate. 
The paper is divided into three parts: the theoretical background for 
4.  See Michael Mussa, "The Role of  the Current Account in Exchange Rate 
Dynamics" (University of Chicago, June 1980); Alan C. Stockman, "A Theory of 
Exchange Rate Determination," Journal of  Political Economy, vol.  88  (August 
1980), pp. 673-98,  and "Exchange Rates, Relative Prices, and Resource Alloca- 
tion," in J. Bhandari  and B.  Putnam,  eds.,  The International  Transmission  of  Eco- 
nomic Disturbances  under Flexible  Exchange  Rates  (MIT  Press,  forthcoming);  and 
Peter Hooper and John Morton, "Fluctuations  in the Dollar: A Model of Nominal 
and Real Exchange Rate Determination,"  International Finance Discussion Paper 
168 (Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, October 1980). 212  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
discussing the fluctuations in current accounts and the real exchange rate, 
a detailed empirical analysis of current account and capital flows in the 
1970s for a cross section of countries, and an analysis of movements of 
exchange rates in recent years, particularly the U.S. rate. 
The Theory of the Current  Account 
Current account movements are best analyzed in a dynamic macro- 
economic  model.  This is because current account surpluses or deficits 
represent national savings or borrowing vis-a-vis the rest of  the world 
and therefore are the outcome of intertemporal choices  of households, 
firms, and governments.5 A  one-period  theory of  the  current account 
that describes a static balance of  imports and exports makes as much 
sense as a one-period theory of  saving or investment. Because  current 
account imbalances reflect intertemporal choices, expectations of future 
events can be  a decisive factor in determining the size of  deficits and 
surpluses, and these expectations play an important role in the theory 
below. 
In two recent studies I have developed  a two-country, multiperiod, 
growth model that provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the 
current account. The model assumes perfect foresight, optimal behavior 
by  agents,  and  perfect  international  capital  mobility.6 Although  the 
model abstracts from many features of reality-for  example, by assum- 
ing full employment-it  provides a point of departure for understanding 
the real world. In this section, I present a simplified two-period version 
that highlights the central lessons of the general model. It helps in under- 
5.  Most macroeconomic models of  the current account give little attention to 
intertemporal considerations,  though one important area where intertemporal as- 
pects have long been emphasized is the trade and development literature.  See, for 
example, Michael Bruno, "The Two-Sector Open Economy and the Real Exchange 
Rate,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  66  (September  1976),  pp.  566-77;  and 
Michael J. Bazdarich, "Optimal Growth and Stages in the Balance of  Payments," 
Journal of International  Economics,  vol.  8 (August  1978),  pp. 425-43. 
6.  Jeffrey Sachs, "Energy  and Growth under Flexible Exchange Rates: A Simu- 
lation Study,"  Working  Paper 582 (National Bureau  of Economic Research,  Novem- 
ber 1980), forthcoming in Bhandari  and Putnam, eds., The International Transmis- 
sion of Economic Disturbances;  and David Lipton and Jeffrey  Sachs, "Accumulation 
and Growth in a Two-Country Model: A Simulation Approach," Working Paper 
572 (National Bureau  of Economic Research, October 1980). Jetfrey  D. Sachs  213 
standing the role of OPEC, government policy,  and capital controls in 
determining current account movements.  I  also  discuss how  changing 
various assumptions of the model alters key results. 
To set the stage, I begin with some accounting identities. The current 
account surplus can be expressed as national income minus national ab- 
sorption, as the export of goods and services minus their import plus in- 
come transfers,  or as national saving minus domestic investment. Let Y be 
gross national product, Q be gross domestic product, and F be net factor 
payments from abroad such as remittances or interest on foreign bonds. 
All variables are expressed in units of the good produced in the home 
country. By definition, 
(1)  Y-  Q+F. 
GNP plus net unilateral transfers from abroad, R, may be used for con- 
sumption, C, gross private saving, SP, and taxes, T: 
(2)  Y+  R=  C+  SP +T. 
Government saving, SG,  is given by T -  G, where G is government con- 
sumption of goods and services. Output market equilibrium requires 
(3)  Q =  C+I+  G +  X-M. 
If the current account surplus, CA, is defined as the net export of goods 
and  services  plus  unilateral  transfers and  net  factor  payments  from 
abroad, equations 1 through 3 provide three equivalent definitions: 
(4)  CA  =X-M+  F+  R 
-  Y-(C  +  I  +  G) +  R 
=  (SP  +  S)  -  I. 
The first equality is the standard definition. The second reflects Sidney 
Alexander's insight that the surplus must also equal income minus ab- 
sorption (C +  I +  G).  The third equality represents CA as the excess of 
saving over investment. When rewritten as CA + I =  SP +  SG, the expres- 
sion shows that national saving must equal national investment, which is 
the sum of domestic I and foreign CA components. 
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nation of the current account is apparent from the absorption form of CA 
in equation 4. Modern theories of saving and investment emphasize that 
the responses of C and I to various disturbances depend crucially on ex- 
pectations of how current shocks affect key future economic variables.7 
Thus the response of C to an exogenous drop in Y is crucially affected by 
how permanent the Y shift is expected to be (assuming that real interest 
rates are constant).  A temporary drop in Y will not be matched by an 
equal fall in C, while a permanent drop in Y will. Similarly, investment 
should move little if the dip in Y is temporary, but should fall if the slump 
is expected to be permanent. Clearly CA  =  Y  -  C -  I  -  G tends to 
worsen in the first case, but not in the second. 
Thus, to forecast the magnitude of the effects of a disturbance on the 
current account, one must ask whether that disturbance is temporary or 
permanent, unanticipated or anticipated. The conventional approach of 
forecasting current account movements based on export and import de- 
mand equations, appears to avoid this complexity, but actually does not. 
A correctly specified import demand equation shows M as a function of 
spending on C, I, and G, and of the relative prices of home and foreign 
goods.  It is necessary therefore to forecast C, I,  and G, to find M  and 
hence the intertemporal saving and investment decisions of households, 
firms, and government. 
Increases in oil prices that permanently reduce Y will, after a period of 
adjustment,  reduce C by about an equal amount. Countries that are heavily 
dependent on oil imports experience large drops in Y and C as a result of 
a permanent oil price increase; oil self-sufficient economies, on the other 
hand, will have little change in these variables. Oil dependence determines 
the extent of the real income loss brought about by OPEC, but not the 
extent of current account deficits since both income and consumption are 
affected. Temporary price increases have  a  different result.  Countries 
heavily dependent on oil have a transitory  fall in Y that will be unmatched 
by a fall in C. These countries will find it worthwhile to borrow tempo- 
rarily in order to smooth consumption over time; because transitory in- 
7.  For a study on savings see, for example, Alan S. Blinder, "Temporary  Income 
Taxes and Consumer Spending,"  Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89 (February 
1981), pp. 26-53; on investment see, among other studies, Olivier Jean Blanchard, 
"Demand Disturbances and Output,"  Discussion Paper 777  (Harvard Institute of 
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come changes should have small effects on C, a temporary price shock 
should lead to larger deficits in oil-dependent countries. 
A Two-Period Model of the Current  Account 
The formal two-period model of the current account developed here 
places great emphasis on the optimal behavior of firms and households, 
and pays explicit attention to the nature of disturbances to the economy. 
The model is based upon life-cycle saving, perfect capital mobility, and 
a value-maximizing investment strategy of firms. Output is supply-deter- 
mined as a function of the capital stock and the real prices of factors of 
production. These  assumptions make  the model  most  appropriate for 
explaining the current account in the intermediate run, over which aggre- 
gate demand effects on output may be ignored. 
Consider a small, open economy that produces a single good at a fixed 
world price of  1. Suppose the economy has a zero initial foreign invest- 
ment position and a first-period capital stock, K1. The real interest rate 
at which domestic households can borrow and lend from the rest of the 
world is fixed at r*. Production in each of the two periods is characterized 
by constant returns to scale and given by 
(5)  Q=  OF(Ki, Lj, N)  i =  1, 2, 
where N is an intermediate input, say oil. The domestic economy pro- 
duces NH units and imports the remainder from the world market at price 
PN, the real price of oil relative to final output. The  0 is  an efficiency 
parameter that may change between  periods.  As  an example,  assume 
that labor is always fully employed at L =  L. Second-period capital, K2, 
equals K1 + I. 
The optimal production and investment decisions in this economy are 
straightforward.  Firms maximize the value of the firm, which is equiva- 
lent to maximizing the discounted value of dividends. Clearly I, is selected 
so that 
(6)  0Q2  (1 +r), 
dK2 
and in each period aQ/aN  =  PN and  aQ/aL  =  w. Here r is the home in- 216  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1981 
terest rate, always equal to r* by the assumption of perfect capital mobil- 
ity. The condition in equation 6 defines an investment schedule of  the 
form 
I  =  K2(r*, 02,  PN2)-  K1 
9K2 <,  O9K2 > o aOK2  >  O. 
ar*  0902  'OPN2  < 
The sign of aK2/aPN2  depends on  a2F/aKaN  in the production function. 
As long as the cross-partial derivative is positive, the "standard case," 
aK2/aPN2,  is  negative.8  In  the  first and  second  periods  the  wage,  w, 
adjusts so that 0Q/lL,  =  wi at full employment. Depending on the pro- 
duction function, awl/PN  >< 0,  while Ow2/OPN2  is less than zero neces- 
sarily.9 
Households maximize a two-period utility function U(C1, C2) subject 
to an intertemporal budget constraint. The discounted value of  house- 
hold consumption, C1 +  C2/(1  +  r),  must equal household wealth, W, 
which is  the  sum of  human wealth, H,  the market value  of  domestic 
firms, V, and the value of domestic production of N, which Nv denotes. 
Thus, 
C2 
(7)  C1i  +  +  r=  =  H +  V +  NV. 
Human wealth, H, is the discounted value of labor income net of labor 
taxes, 
H  =  wiLi - T,  +  w2L2 -T2 
H=wiLi-Ti+I  ?r 
8. It can be easily shown that aK2/OPN2  equals  FKN/[02(F2KN  -  FNNFKK)],  which 
has the same sign as FKN.  If production is constant elasticity of  substitution,  CES, 
among  K, L, and N, the FKN is necessarily  greater  than zero. (Cobb-Douglas  is a special 
case.) Also, with a two-level CES technology in V(K,  L) and N, the FKN is again posi- 
tive. One case in which  FKN  is less than zero is given by Q2  =  02 F[G(K, N),  L],  where 
the function  G is CES with elasticity  a; F(G, L) is CES with elasticity  o-1;  and 0f is much 
greater  than a,. Econometric  estimates  of cost functions for aggregate  production  tech- 
nologies  generally  imply that FKN is greater  than zero. 
9.  With respect  to wages, the condition on awllaPNl  less than zero is analogously 
given  by FLN  greater  than zero.  On the other  hand,  because  aQ2/aL2,  aQ2/aK2,  and 
aQ'2/aN2  lie  on  a  factor-price frontier, we  must have  declining  w2  (equal  to 
aQ2/aL2)  when  PN2  (equal  to  aQ2/aN2)  rises,  as  long  as  1  +  r  (equal  to 
aQ2/aK2)  is  unchanged. Jefirey  D. Sachs  217 
The value of  firms, V,  is  the discounted value  of  dividend payments. 
Assuming  that investment is  financed by  retained earnings  (which  is 
without  loss  of  generality),  first-period dividends  are  Q1  -  PNlNl  - 
w1Ll  -  I,;  second-period  dividends  are Q2 -  PN2N2 -  w2L2. Thus, 
V =  (Ql  -  PN1Nl  -  w1L1 -  Il)  +  (Q2  -  PN2N2  -  w2L2)/(1  +  r). 
Finally, the value of domestic oil, NV,  is given by 
NV  =  PN1NH' +  (PN2NH')/(1 +  r). 
It is convenient to assemble these pieces and rewrite wealth as 
(8)  W =  [Qi-Gl-I,  +  PN,(NI-Nl)] 
+  [Q2  -  G2  +  PN2(N2'  -  N2)]/(1  +  r), 
where use  has been  made of  the  two-period  government budget con- 
straint, 
(9)  G 
___  _ 
T,  I'2 
G1+l  +  r =T++  r+ 
I denote the expressions in brackets from equation 8 with the symbols Z1 
and Z2, respectively. Note that these expressions are the GDP net of gov- 
ernment spending and investment for each period because GDP  in do- 
mestic  goods  units  is  Qi  +  PNj(N  -N).10 
In general, current consumption can be written as a function of wealth 
and r: C1 =  C1(W, r).  I consider the case of  an additively separable, 
isoelastic utility function in C1 and C2, 
U(Cb, C2)  +  6,  -  >  0, 
where 8 is the rate of time preference and y is a measure of curvature of 
the function. For this function, consumption is linear in wealth; specifi- 
cally, 
C1 =xw  A  X=  [1  +  (1  +  r)1A)+/r]1 
10. A tricky  point is that Qi  +  P(NJN  -  Ni) is real GDP using a single-deflation 
method (that is, nominal GDP divided by the price of home output), but is not the 
standard  measure of real GDP using the typical double-deflation  method. For this, 
N-  -  Ni is multiplied  by a base-period real price of oil so that real GDP becomes 
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From equation 7,  C2 =  (1  +  r) (W -  C1), so C2 is also linear in wealth. 
Note  that C1 <  C2 as r  S  S. The  importance of  various  assumptions 
about the utility function for the current account has been studied in an 
excellent recent work by Razin and Svensson.1" 
Now it is possible to solve for the current account. In each period, net 
exports of the produced good are given by Qi -  C  -  G  -  I,  while net 
exports of the input in terms of final product are given as PN,(N'  -  Ni). 
The first-period current account is therefore equal to 
(10)  CA1  =  (Ql  -  C1  -  G-  I)  +  PN,(Nf' -  N1). 
Clearly, CA1 =  Z-  C1  by definition of Z1. And, from the various budget 
constraints, it is easy to show that CA2 =-CA1. 
THE  RESPONSE  TO  SHOCKS 
Figure 1, based on the budget constraint C1 +  Cj  (1  +  r)  =  Z1 + 
Z2/(1  +  r)  shows the effects of various shocks on CA1. (Analytical  ex- 
pressions  for  CA1 are in  general  complicated  and  are derived in  an 
appendix available from the author.) In figure 1, the intertemporal budget 
constraint is represented by the line through Z  =  (Z1, Z2)  with slope 
-  (1  +  r).  The linearity of the schedule results from the assumptions 
of perfect capital mobility and fixed terms of trade between home  and 
foreign output. The consumption choice C =  (C1, C2) is at the tangency 
of  the  indifference curve with  the  budget  constraint. The  first-period 
current account balance is Z1 -  C1. Because Z1 is greater than C1 in the 
diagram, a first-period surplus results. 
Consider next the effects on CA1  of movements in the exogenous vari- 
ables &i,  Pj,  and Gi. Because Zi  =  Q  -  I,  +  PN1(NH-  N1) -  G1  and 
Z2  =  Q2  +  PN2(N2'-  N2)-  G2, other things being equal, positive shocks 
to Qi raise Z1, shocks to G1  lower Z1, and shocks to PNj raise Z1 if and only 
if N'  is greater than N1. Anticipated positive shocks to 02 raise Z2 while 
lowering Z1  because  of  an  induced  increase in  investment.  Similarly, 
higher PN2 raises Z1 because of the negative investment effect while raising 
11. It is unfortunate  that their study arrived  too late for incorporation  into this 
paper, although there are obvious similarities in approach.  See Lars E. 0.  Svensson 
and Assof Razin, "The Terms of Trade, Spending, and the Current Account: The 
Harberger-Laursen-Metzler  Effect," Seminar Paper 170 (University of Stockholm, 
Institute for International  Economic Studies, March 1981). Jefirey D. Sachs  219 
Figure 1.  Determination of the Current Account 
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or lowering Z2, depending on whether N2H  is greater or less than N2. Higher 
G2  necessarily lowers Z2. 
Figure 2 illustrates the crucial difference in effect of temporary and 
permanent shifts in Z, without having to be explicit about which of the 
underlying shocks is moving Z.  The two shocks in the figure have the 
same drop in Z1; one is accompanied by a decline in Z2 (a "permanent" 
decline),  the other is not  (a  "temporary" decline).  The first represents 
a greater reduction in wealth and hence consumption possibilities. The 
shifts are shown as the movement from Z to ZP and to ZT,  respectively. 
Generally a temporary decline in Z leads to a much larger fall in the sur- 
plus (or rise in the deficit) than does a permanent drop. With a temporary 
shortfall, households spread some of the loss to the second period, thus 
dissaving to smooth consumption over time; with a permanent decline 
in Z,  households  do not borrow against second-period income.  When 
Z1 and Z2  fall in equal proportions, CA1 also falls in the same propor- 220  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
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tion.  Initial  surpluses or  deficits become  smaller. From  a position  of 
initial current account balance, a proportionate reduction in Z,  and Z, 
leaves the current account unchanged. 
Consumption depends on the discounted sum of Z-private  wealth- 
but not its time profile. Hence if output is rising, there is likely to be a first- 
period deficit and a second-period surplus, whereas if output is falling 
there may be a first-period  surplus. Thus, as illustrated in figure 3, the pro- 
file ZO  leads to a surplus and Z' to a deficit. Households save more in the 
ZO  case in anticipation of the decline in Z. A  comparison of ZO  and Z' 
illustrates the effect of a shock, such as a fiscal spending increase, which 
changes the time profile but not the discounted value of Z. A temporary 
rise in government spending (Gl  rising and G, falling so that G,  +  G,1 
( 1 +  r) is constant)  is represented by a change from ZO  to Z'. The cur- 
rent account changes from a surplus, CAO,  to a deficit, CA'. 
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Figure  3. The Effects  of Alternative  Income  Profiles 
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Figure 3 also illustrates the effects of  shifts in investment. Suppose, 
for purposes of illustration, there is a rise in physical investment that just 
earns the market rate of return. Then ZO  shifts to Z1 (Z1 falls by I and Z2 
rises by I(1  +  r)),  leaving the economy  on  the original budget con- 
straint. Because  the  rise in  I  does  not  affect total  wealth  and  hence 
consumption, the current account worsens by precisely the amount of 
the investment boom. Households regard corporate investment as a per- 
fect substitute for personal saving because both earn the market interest 
rate, r, and because households own the firms. More typically, with a shift 
in technical productivity (a change in 02)  inframarginal  investments earn 
more than the market rate of return. Here the decline in CA,  following 
the investment is greater than on  a one-to-one  basis. This is shown in 
figure 3 by the movement from ZO  to Z2. 
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put and Z are associated with deficits, and booms with surpluses. This is 
opposite the conclusion from the usual Keynesian analysis and from the 
conventional wisdom  about the cyclical fluctuations in the current ac- 
count. The empirical links between output fluctuations and the current 
account appear to be rather weak for the OECD economies,  and more- 
over, to the extent that such links exist, it appears that the drop in I dur- 
ing a recession, not output, explains the association between current ac- 
count surpluses and recession. 
OIL  PRICE  SHOCKS 
Next, consider the effects of a rise in oil prices that is perceived to be 
permanent. If there are no investment consequences to an increase in oil 
prices, the effects are simply those of a permanent income change. Z1 and 
Z2 fall for net importers and rise for net exporters. The greater the depen- 
dence on imported oil, the larger is the fall in C1 and C2 after an oil-price 
shock. But there should be no tendency for oil-dependent economies to 
run larger deficits than oil-exporting countries. The CA1 shifts in propor- 
tion to Z1 when Z1 and Z2  change in equal proportion. The depressing 
effects of oil price increases on investment tend to improve the current 
account for both oil exporters and importers. 
Unlike a permanent price shock, a temporary rise in PN has opposite 
first-period effects for oil exporters and importers: the exporter has an 
increase in wealth and will spread the gain over time, running a surplus; 
the importer will borrow from the second period in which oil bills will not 
be as much of a burden. 
In two important ways the model must be modified when used to de- 
scribe short-run behavior,  particularly that  of  the  large  oil-exporting 
countries. The  model  abstracts from cyclical  demand effects that may 
have come from the oil shock and the responses of government to it. The 
model assumes that there are no perception lags or costs to rapid adjust- 
ment of consumption following an oil price rise. Different short-run results 
are obtained if C1 adjusts to its new equilibrium slowly after a shock. For 
a major oil producer the required upward adjustment  in C1  may be several 
hundred percent, and physical bottlenecks alone may slow such a signifi- 
cant rise in consumption. Costs of adjustment to raising C1 were dramati- 
cally  illustrated when  cement-carrying ships were trapped for  months 
outside the inadequate port at Lagos, Nigeria, after the post-1973  boom Jeffrey D. Sachs  223 
in  spending. Many  studies  of  "high absorber" versus  "low  absorber" 
OPEC countries have investigated these costs of adjustment.12 
Adjustment costs  provide one explanation for a  high marginal pro- 
pensity to save of OPEC members following an oil-price increase. The non- 
renewable nature of oil reserves provides another. When NH is much less 
than NH, even a permanent rise in PN has the effect of a transitory increase 
in oil-exprot earnings. If PN is not expected to fall, the OPEC countries 
face the prospect of declining income in future years. (Thus a transitory 
shock for an oil producer may be a permanent shock for an importing 
country.)  Because OPEC's current GDP exceeds long-run GDP, OPEC 
members have the  incentive  to  accumulate financial assets to  smooth 
consumption over time. In the model, this is described as a declining Z 
profile, which results in surpluses. 
A second important modification to the model for short-run analysis 
may help to explain oil-exporter deficits. To the extent that oil production 
itself requires physical investment, a rise in PN may generate a particu- 
larly large rise in I,  in oil-rich economies,  so that these countries may 
have deficits caused by an investment boom like that illustrated in figure 3. 
Empirically this effect clearly shows up within the OECD countries. 
Interest Rates and Equilibrium 
Thus far in the discussion the world interest rate has been taken as 
exogenous. In this section, I emphasize its important role in equilibrating 
world output  and capital markets. Reductions  in  r*  and the  induced 
changes in investment help to explain the huge deficit of  oil-importing 
countries since 1973. In the absence of such reductions one would expect 
oil price rises to lead to surpluses in the oil-importing countries. There is 
in reality no single, world interest rate; r* should be regarded as a proxy 
for  a vector  of  rates in  different countries that move  more or less  in 
tandem. 
Just as the current account equilibrium within a country can be vari- 
ously described, the condition for equilibrium of the world capital market, 
still assuming full employment, can be stated in a number of ways: world 
investment equals world saving; the  sum of  current account surpluses 
12. For a discussion,  see David R. Morgan, "Fiscal Policy in Oil Exporting  Coun- 
tries, 1972-78," IMF Stafi  Papers, vol. 26 (March 1979), pp. 55-81. 224  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1981 
is zero; world output supply equals world output demand. In general, 
if  desired world  saving exceeds  desired world  investment, one  would 
expect the world interest rate to fall, just as the domestic real interest rate 
is expected to decline in a closed economy. A  drop in r* tends to raise 
investment and increase consumption relative to income in the various 
countries, thus reducing world saving and raising world investment until 
output and capital markets clear. This adjustment mechanism must be 
qualified because net saving is not necessarily a monotonically increasing 
function of the interest rate. 
This reasoning implies that a permanent OPEC price rise should have 
a depressing effect on the world real interest rate. As shown above, at an 
initial r*, the rise in PN  will lead to a desired surplus in the oil-importing 
countries. Investment will tend to fall because of the complementarity of 
oil and capital. Consumption will drop by about as much as real GDP at 
the time of the price increase, so that dissaving is not required to pay for 
higher oil imports. And OPEC countries are also likely to want a surplus 
at the initial r*, as I have argued. If these conditions hold, an incipient 
excess supply of world output develops,  and r* must fall until desired 
OPEC surpluses are matched by desired deficits among oil-consuming 
economies. Put another way, r* falls because investment demand falls and 
income is redistributed to the OPEC region, which has a relatively low 
propensity to consume. 
Two major caveats are in order. First, if the rise in PN is perceived as 
temporary, the  oil-importing countries will  want  deficits at the  initial 
interest rate. It is possible that these desired deficits and the OPEC sur- 
plus balance at the initial interest rate, so that r* need not decline. Second, 
relaxing the full employment assumption, if higher PN leads to a signifi- 
cant  cyclical  contraction in  the  importing countries, households  may 
choose  to  dissave at the initial interest rate, borrowing against higher 
future income. Again, the decline in r* may not occur. 
Table 6 shows the changes in ex post real interest rates (measured in 
terms of  the national GNP  deflator)  in four major OECD  economies 
between 1965 and 1979. There is a clear and consistent drop of real rates 
of interest after 1973. 
The ex post rate is assumed to be a proxy for the unobserved ex ante 
rate, which is the appropriate rate for saving and investment decisions. 
This assumption was also made by Mishkin, who recently documented 
the decline in ex  post U.S.  real interest rates after 1973.  Because  the 
1973-74  period of oil shock was also a time of unanticipated inflation, Je0lrey D. Sachs  225 
Table 6. Real Interest  Rates, Major  Industrial  Countries,  Selected  Years  and Periods, 
1965-79a 
Average 
Country  1965-72  1973-79  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
United States  0.7  -0.6  -0.5  -3.0  -0.2  -0.3  -0.8  -1.8  1.9 
United Kingdom  0.2  -5.4  -1.3  -17.8  -6.2  -1.9  -4.7  -1.2  -4.5 
Germany  -0.5  -0.6  0.2  -2.6  0.2  -0.3  -1.3  -1.1  0.6 
Japan  0.4  -2.2  -14.1  -7.5  1.6  -0.6  1.0  0.2  4.3 
Sources: Interest rates for all countries and prices for the United States and the United Kingdom- 
Organisation for  Economic Co-operation and Development,  Main  Economic  Indicators,  various issues; 
prices for Japan and Germany-International  Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  various 
issues. 
a.  Calculated as the average for the year of the difference between the quarterly average Treasury bill 
rate and the change, at an annual rate, in the GNP deflator from one period to the next. 
the ex post rates are probably underestimates of the ex ante rates. In an- 
other recent, unpublished study, James Wilcox directly tests for the role 
of import prices in determining the nominal interest rate in the United 
States in 1972-78.  In a regression of nominal interest rates on expected 
inflation (using the Livingston expectations data),  monetary and fiscal 
variables, the relative price of imports, and domestic GNP  (serving as 
a proxy for the oil price hike),  Wilcox confirms a large and robust nega- 
tive relationship between real import prices and the interest rate, holding 
expectations constant.'3 
Extensions of the Theory of the Current Account 
The basic view  that the current account results from intertemporal 
savings and investment decisions of domestic agents can be elaborated in 
a variety of directions. In this section, I discuss the effects on the current 
account of demand-induced fluctuations in output, capital controls, fiscal 
policy, and changes in the terms of trade of final goods. 
FLUCTUATIONS  IN  OUTPUT 
Until this point, output fluctuations have been taken as exogenous or 
as supply-side responses to exogenous shifts in technology, 0, and input 
13. See Frederic S. Mishkin, "The Real Interest Rate: An Empirical Investiga- 
tion,"  Working  Paper 622 (National Bureau  of Economic Research,  January 1981); 
and James  A. Wilcox, "Interest  Rates, Expected  Inflation,  and Supply  Shocks or Why 
Interest Rates Have Been So Low in the 1970's," paper presented at the NBER 
Conference  on Inflation and Financial Markets, May 1981. 226  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1981 
price changes, P,  With these types of shocks, temporary reductions in 
output (or more generally, Z)  lead to deficits, and booms to surpluses. 
This response follows  from  the  assumption  about how  a household's 
saving responds to  transitory income  shocks but does  not fit with the 
conventional macroeconomic  view  that booms  lead to  deficits as high 
income causes a rise in demand for imports. 
The apparent contradiction is easily resolved. The correlation of Q and 
CA should critically depend on the underlying shocks moving these vari- 
ables. A temporary rise in 01 or fall in PN1 causes both CA1 and Q1  to rise. 
Alternatively, a temporary increase in G1,  or an anticipated rise in 02 or fall 
in PN2, causes CA1 to fall, and may cause Q1  to rise if aggregate demand 
shifts affect output on Keynesian grounds. A negative statistical correla- 
tion between CA1 and Q1  will result. Demand-induced increases in output 
tend to increase saving and hence augment the current account effects of 
a change  in 01 and partially  offset  the effects  of  a change  in 02, PN2, or G1. 
Consider, for example, an investment boom following a rise in 02. If Q1 
increases in response to the rise in I,, household saving will also increase 
and in part pay for the higher I,.  The CA1 will not fall as much as in the 
case of fixed Q1. 
It is likely that fluctuations in I jointly affect Q and CA and account for 
the negative simple correlation of Q and CA. As  shown in table 7, the 
predominantly negative coefficients on GNP relative to trend, represented 
by  GNP  gap, in  explaining CA  are generally less  significant and less 
negative when I is included in the regressions. By contrast, the effects of 
investment are almost always negative and frequently significantly so. In 
principle,  shifts in  consumption  demand  or  government  expenditures 
should also induce a negative correlation between output and the current 
account. It appears that the effects of variations in these other demands 
have been largely offset by variations in 0 or in export demands, both of 
which would lead to a positive correlation between output and CA. 
CAPITAL  CONTROLS 
Another important step in bringing the basic model closer to reality is 
the introduction of capital controls. A prime instrument for a country to 
use in achieving current account objectives is a regulatory restriction on 
international borrowing and lending. For a small economy with perfect 
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depend on world interest rates, which are exogenous. If binding capital 
restrictions are imposed,  the home  interest rate may  deviate from the 
world  rate; the  home  rate adjusts until  a  current account  balance  is 
achieved that is consistent with the capital controls. One common type of 
control is a ceiling on net new foreign borrowing, so that CA is fixed at 
CA. Solution of the model in this case simply involves finding the r that 
yields CA. More sophisticated controls may impose, in effect, a rising tax 
rate on incremental  foreign borrowing. With such controls, r = r* + f(CA), 
f' <  0; and r and CA are determined simultaneously. The endogeneity of 
home r quantitatively but not qualitatively affects certain key results of 
the last section. A rise in 02  under perfect capital mobility may lead to a 
large CA deficit reflecting induced investment demand and a decline in 
saving, as households borrow against higher future income. With imper- 
fect capital mobility, a boom in investment opportunities will be financed 
less by foreign capital inflows and more by the domestic saving induced 
by an increase in home interest rates. 
FISCAL  POLICY 
Countries may also pursue current account objectives with fiscal instru- 
ments. It was shown above that temporary cuts in government spending 
provide a powerful vehicle for increasing CA1, while permanent reduc- 
tions in G (for example, equal cuts in G1 and G2) may have negligible or 
perverse effects on the current account. An unrealistic aspect of the model 
is that labor income tax policy, as distinct from spending policy, has no 
effect on the current account (to verify this point, note that Z1, Z2, and 
hence C1 are not functions of T, and T2). This result reflects the assump- 
tion that households internalize the government's intertemporal budget 
constraint in choosing their consumption path; the assumption's plausi- 
bility depends on whether households have perfect foresight and a plan- 
ning horizon that matches the horizon of the economy. These particular 
assumptions have been  persuasively challenged in  recent work.14  It is 
more plausible that households pierce the "corporate veil" than the gov- 
ernment veil in making saving decisions, because  the former does  not 
require that the planning horizon of households match that of the econ- 
14. See William H. Buiter and James Tobin, "Debt Neutrality: A Brief Review 
of Doctrine and Evidence," in George M. von Furstenberg,  ed., Social Security vs. 
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Table 7. Explaining  the Current  Account  with  Investment  and  the GNP Gap, 
Developed  Countries,  1960-79a 
Independent  variable 
Summary  statistic 
Ratio of invest- 
Country  and  GNP  ment  to GNP  Durbin- 
equation  gap  (I/GNP)  Time  R2  Watson 
Australia 
7-1  -0.145  ...  0.0010  0.00  1.40 
(-0.7)  (1.4) 
7-2  -0.04  -0.44  0.0000  0.50  1.50 
(-0.1)  (-1.4)  (0.0) 
Austria 
7-3  -0.07  ...  -0.0004  -0.10  1.30 
(-0.5)  (-0.79) 
7-4  -0.02  -0.23  0.0000  -0.09  1.34 
(-0.1)  (-1.0)  (0.0) 
Belgium 
7-5  -0.18  ...  0.0000  -0.08  0.52 
(-0.7)  (0.14) 
7-6  -0.16  0.33  -0.0002  -0.10  0.55 
(-0.6)  (0.8)  (-0.4) 
Canada 
7-7  -0.47  ...  0.0004  0.17  1.12 
(-2.4)  (1.0) 
7-8  -0.38  -0.17  0.0005  0.14  0.96 
(-1.4)  (-0.5)  (1.1) 
Denmark 
7-9  -0.36  ...  -0.0017  0.46  1.88 
(-3-0)  (-4.1) 
7-10  -0.40  0.129  -0.0019  0.45  2.09 
(-3.0)  (0.8)  (-3.8) 
Finland 
7-11  -0.38  ...  -0.0000  0.12  0.91 
(-2.0)  (-0.9) 
7-12  0.03  -0.76  0.0000  0.54  1.30 
(0.2)  (-3.9)  (0.2) 
France 
7-13  -0.05  ...  0.0020  0.20  1.87 
(-0.1)  (0.3) 
7-14  -0.04  -0.78  -0.0010  0.13  1.76 
(-0.1)  (-2.1)  (-1.2) 
Germany 
7-15  -0.26  ...  -0.0001  0.20  1.46 
(-2.5)  (-0.5) 
7-16  -0.09  -0.28  -0.0005  0.24  1.32 
(-2.6)  (-1.4)  (-1.3) Je0rey D. Sachs  229 
Table 7 (continued) 
Independent  variable 
Ratio of invest-  Summary  statistic 
Country  and  GNP  ment  to GNP  Durbin- 
equation  gap  (I/GNP)  Time  Watson 
Italy 
7-17  -0.12  ...  -0.0010  -0.05  0.83 
(-0.5)  (-  1.0) 
7-18  0.20  -1.18  -0.0020  0.57  1.62 
(1.2)  (-5.1)  (-2.8) 
Japan 
7-19  0.07  ...  0.0009  0.03  1.36 
(0.8)  (1.6) 
7-20  0.11  -0.12  0.0009  0.00  1.33 
(1.0)  (-0.7)  (1.7) 
Netherlands 
7-21  0.055  ...  0.0000  -0.12  0.64 
(0.2)  (0.08) 
7-22  0.12  -0.67  -0.0010  0.12  0.60 
(0.5)  (-3.0)  (-1.9) 
Norway 
7-23  -0.09  ...  -0.0040  0.16  0.83 
(-0.53)  (-1.9) 
7-24  0.16  -0.93  0.0004  0.79  1.98 
(1.8)  (-7.2)  (0.3) 
United 
Kingdom 
7-25  -0.14  ...  -0.0005  -0.04  1.00 
(-0.7)  (-1.0) 
7-26  -0.23  -0.87  0.0002  0.19  1.10 
(-1.3)  (-2.4)  (-0.4) 
United States 
7-27  -0.06  ...  -0.0006  0.38  1.56 
(-1.8)  (-3.7) 
7-28  -0.03  -0.22  -0.0003  0.40  1.57 
(-0.8)  (-1.2)  (-1.4) 
Sources: Calculations by the author. Current account-Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Main Economic Indicators; GNP  and fixed capital formation for all countries except the 
United States-International  Monetary Fund, International  Financial Statistics; U.S. fixed capital forma- 
tion-OECD,  Nationial  Accounts of OECD Countries, 1950-78 (Paris: OECD,  1980) and recent supple- 
ments. 
a.  The dependent variable is the current account balance as a proportion of  GNP.  The GNP  gap is 
calculated as log (GNP/GNP  trend), where GNP trend is constructed by fitting trend lines between the 
logarithm of GNP in 1960 and 1973 and in 1973 and 1979. The I/GNP  is  gross fixed capital formation 
as a proportion of GNP. The numbers in parentheses  are t-statistics. 230  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
omy. Moreover, retained earnings of firms are presumably capitalized in 
the stock market, while future tax liabilities are not bought and sold, and 
thereby valued, in organized markets. 
TERMS-OF-TRADE  EFFECTS 
Another unrealistic feature of the model is the assumption of one final 
good. The model can be extended to examine the implications of individ- 
ual economies producing distinct final goods that may be imperfect sub- 
stitutes in consumption and investment. Let P be the price of the home 
final good and P*  the foreign price of the foreign final good. Now P/eP* 
and r simultaneously adjust to equilibrate home and foreign output mar- 
kets and balance global saving and investment. An important interme- 
diate case between the models  for small and large countries is  one  in 
which the economy is small in import markets, taking r* and P*/P*  as 
fixed, but large in the export market, facing a downward sloping demand 
schedule for exports. In this case, fluctuations in export demand are re- 
introduced as a determinant of the CA  balance; they have no separate 
role in the model described above. 
Once again, it is important to recognize the difference between per- 
manent and temporary shocks. Permanent shocks to export demand have 
little effect on the current account, while temporary fluctuations may have 
a large effect. A permanent increase in export demand raises P/eP*  but 
does not necessarily affect intertemporal saving decisions.  If there are 
no investment consequences of the shift, the net result is more exports, 
more imports, and higher P/eP*.  The effect on the current account is like 
that of a permanent rise in Z, and thus the CA  effects depend on r and 8. 
The rise in P/eP*  is also likely to increase I. A rise in P/eP*  decreases 
PN/P,  because PN/P  =  (P*N/P*)  (P*e/P)  and I is likely to rise as PN/P 
falls. The reduction in the relative price of foreign goods themselves may 
also stimulate investment if the foreign good is an investment good. If the 
investment response to the demand shift is sufficiently great, the effect of 
a permanent upward shift in  the  demand for  exports is  a first-period 
deficit, not a surplus! This brief discussion should indicate the danger of 
mechanically linking a country's current account balance to trend changes 
in the demand for its goods. A  shift in demand away from a country's 
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a deficit. On the other hand, a temporary increase in export demand is 
likely to generate a surplus, for now the demand shift is akin to a tem- 
porary rise in Z, which was shown to raise CA1. 
A realistic model of the OPEC price increase would allow for many 
regions, each producing imperfect substitutes for the  outputs of  other 
regions, and each with different endowments of oil. Some of the implica- 
tions of  a change in PN that arise in this broader context  can be  dis- 
cussed by drawing on the two-country model. An interesting comparison 
is between two countries whose residents have the same utility function 
and share the same technologies but have different natural endowments 
of N. A rise in real energy prices that is perceived as temporary causes 
relatively larger deficits in the resource-poor economy,  RP.  But  for  a 
permanent rise in prices, there is no reason for the RP economy to run 
larger deficits than the resource-rich economy, RR. In general, the oppo- 
site should be the case. Because the oil price rise unambiguously causes a 
larger,  drop in lifetime income in the RP economy, aggregate consump- 
tion will fall more in this economy  than in the RR  economy.  The RP 
economy will have a larger rise in final good exports that will match the 
difference in oil imports. Its larger rise in exports will be accompanied by 
a fall in the relative price of its export good. Both economies  will also 
have a drop in investment, but I will probably decline more in the RP 
economy because its larger terms-of-trade loss results in a larger reduc- 
tion in the marginal product of capital. The differential investment per- 
formance, then, largely explains the differential CA performance; deficits 
will be smaller in the RP economy, where investment declines more. 
An Empirical Analysis of Current Account Flows 
The previous analysis helps account for the direction and magnitude of 
international capital flows in the 1970s.  The oil price increases in 1973 
and 1979 help explain the large OPEC surpluses in the 1970s, but they 
do not go  far in  accounting for  the distribution of  the  corresponding 
deficits among oil-importing countries. Recall tables 1 through 5; LDC 
deficits are too large to be attributed to increased costs of oil imports, 
and within the LDCs and developed countries, dependence on oil imports 
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Popular explanations of the current account have failed to recognize 
the large shifts in the  distribution of  world  investment in  the  1970s. 
Theories of the current account that focus  on oil flows or government 
deficits implicitly attribute current account movements to  shifts in na- 
tional saving rather than to domestic investment. This view is particularly 
inappropriate for OECD countries, where shifts in investment have typi- 
cally dominated saving rate movements in explaining current account pat- 
terns. In fact, downward shifts in saving rates after 1973 are statistically 
correlated with current account surpluses, not deficits! 
Within the LDCs, the great heterogeneity of economies leads to a large 
variation in key factors causing movements in the current account. The 
dominant determinants of current account movements in economies such 
as Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand 
countries with  diversified export bases  plus  growing manufacturing 
sectors-were  shifts in investment rates after 1973. For LDCs with a high 
reliance on exports from primary-commodity sectors, transitory shifts in 
the terms of trade for exports were crucial for the current account. Thus, 
when copper prices collapsed in 1975, saving rates in Chile and Zambia 
(and to some extent, Peru) fell sharply. Because of their size and level of 
development, the pattern of  the first group of  countries dominates the 
LDC data examined below. 
To understand the importance of these shocks, I have looked  at the 
economies of  a subset of LDCs  and developed countries in the  1970s. 
The  LDCs  are the  ten  countries  analyzed in  Solomon's  1977  BPEA 
paper.15 This group includes most major middle- to high-income, non- 
European developing countries, and overlaps with the OECD designation 
of "newly industrialising countries" (NICs).16  Solomon selected this list 
because it includes the top borrowers from external, private sources. The 
LDC current account deficits of the ten countries accounted for an aver- 
age of 52 percent of the overall deficits of nonoil developing countries in 
1974-76.  The  accumulated net debt of  the ten countries in  1976  was 
51 percent of overall net debt of LDCs for that year. Most of the coun- 
tries have remained high borrowers since the 1977 study, with the stun- 
ning exception of Taiwan, whose external debt was fully paid with the 
15. Robert Solomon, "A Perspective on  the  Debt  of  Developing Countries, 
BPEA,  2:1977,  pp. 479-501. 
16. The  non-European NICs  are  Brazil, Mexico,  Hong  Kong,  Korea,  and 
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large current account surpluses in 1976-78.  I also selected, as developed 
countries, the fifteen OECD economies for which the data were adequate 
for the period under study. 
Data on saving, investment, the current account, and the national debt 
are shown in tables 8 and 9. The investment rate is gross fixed capital 
formation, If, as a percent of GNP; for the LDCs the saving rate is defined 
as GNP plus transfers from abroad minus private and public consumption 
expenditure, as a percentage of GNP. For LDCs, saving, S, and CA have 
been adjusted for the capital gains on the outstanding debt. Collecting the 
necessary data for this correction for the OECD economies proved too 
difficult, however.'7 Note that CA/GNP  does not equal S/GNP  -  I/GNP 
in tables 8 and 9,  as indicated by equation 4,  because I/GNP  in both 
tables excludes inventory accumulation. 
A  comparison of  the  two  groups of  countries shows,  between  the 
periods of  1965-73  and 1974-79,  that CA/GNP  dropped considerably 
more in the aggregate for the LDCs  than for the developed  countries. 
This difference can be traced to a rise in I/GNP  that surpassed a rise or 
accompanied a decline in S/GNP  in the large LDCs; in most developed 
countries, both I/GNP  and S/GNP  fell,  with the drop in saving rates 
exceeding the fall in I/GNP.  The investment behavior within each group 
is fairly uniform. In eight of the ten LDCs, I/GNP  rose; I/GNP  fell in 
ten of the fifteen developed countries. 
The last rows of tables 8 and 9 show aggregate measures of I/GNP, 
S/GNP,  and CA/GNP  for the two groups. Compositional effects give rise 
to substantial differences between the experience of the typical country 
and the behavior of the aggregates. These effects are particularly striking 
for the OECD. Although ten developed economies, including the largest, 
experienced a decline in investment rates, the overall OECD investment 
rate is about constant. This is because the fast-growing countries in the 
OECD are also the high investment countries. Thus the I/GNP  of the 
high-investment countries receives greater weight each year in the overall 
ratio for  the  OECD.  The  country-by-country decline  in  I/GNP  and 
S/GNP  is largely concealed in the aggregate. A fixed-weight index for the 
fifteen countries would show sizable drops for I/GNP  and S/GNP. 
17. The data on the LDC debt are collected and reported  by the Organisation  for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),  while the net external invest- 
ment positions of the OECD economies are reported by the countries themselves, 
if at all; it was difficult  to obtain the necessary  time series on a year-to-year  basis. 234  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
Table 8. Saving,  Investment,  the Current  Account,  and National  Debt, Adjusted  for 
Inflation, Selected LDCs,  1965-79a 
Percent 
Country  and  Average 
item  1965-73 1974-79b  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
Argentina 
I/GNP  19.8  21.2  20.6  21.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
S/GNP  20.2  19.1  20.8  17.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
CA/GNP  -0.2  -3.3  -1.9  -4.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
D/GNP  4.8  8.1  5.2  11.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Brazilc 
I/GNP  22.6  23.4  24.2  25.5  24.0  22.4  22.2  21.9 
S/GNP  23.2  21.0  25.8  21.0  20.5  20.8  19.8  18.1 
CA/GNP  -1.7  -3.6  -5.8  -4.5  -3.5  -1.6  -2.4  -3.7 
D/GNP  4.0  19.2  16.0  17.1  19.5  19.2  21.4  21.9 
Chile 
I/GNP  13.8  10.1  12.3  10.2  8.9  9.1  n.a.  n.a. 
S/GNP  13.3  8.3  14.9  2.8  8.4  7.3  n.a.  n.a. 
CA/GNP  -1.6  -0.2  1.5  -3.5  2.9  -1.8  n.a.  n.a. 
D/GNP  21.1  32.7  26.3  42.0  33.9  28.7  n.a.  n.a. 
Colombia 
I/GNP  19.7  19.2  19.4  18.9  18.4  18.9  20.4  n.a. 
S/GNP  18.3  22.5  21.1  18.0  22.1  26.9  24.3  n.a. 
CA/GNP  -2.7  0.7  -1.5  0.1  0.9  3.1  1.1  n.a. 
D/GNP  14.6  17.7  18.3  18.7  20.0  16.0  15.4  n.a. 
Mexicoc 
I/GNP  19.5  22.6  21.5  22.7  22.3  20.5  22.8  25.7 
S/GNP  18.6  22.5  23.2  20.6  21.1  21.8  23.3  25.0 
CA/GNP  -2.1  -3.0  -3.1  -4.2  -3.6  -1.2  -2.5  -3.4 
D/GNP  11.1  21.7  16.3  18.3  22.1  25.9  24.6  23.4 
Peru 
I/GNP  12.7  15.4  15.1  17.3  16.7  14.6  14.0  14.5 
S/GNP  15.9  15.0  14.3  10.8  11.9  10.9  18.1  23.8 
CA/GNP  1.7  -1.8  -4.5  -8.7  -6.0  -4.2  3.5  9.1 
D/GNP  19.9  31.0  21.7  22.4  28.3  36.4  42.5  34.8 
Philippines 
I/GNP  16.2  23.0  18.6  24.2  24.6  23.4  23.1  24.2 
S/GNP  21.4  26.7  25.9  26.2  25.6  25.9  28.1  28.6 
CA/GNP  0.3  -2.4  -0.8  -4.9  -5.1  -2.6  -0.1  -0.7 
D/GNP  9.8  18.4  14.2  17.2  21.8  20.3  18.7  18.2 Je0yrey  D. Sachs  235 
Table 8 (continued) 
Country  and  Average 
item  1965-73  1974-79b  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
South  Korea 
I/GNP  23.9  27.1  25.2  25.6  23.5  25.7  30.3  32.1 
S/GNP  19.5  25.3  22.7  20.9  25.0  26.5  28.2  28.3 
CA/GNP  -6.4  -4.3  -8.0  -8.0  -0.2  -0.6  -2.6  -6.7 
D/GNP  2.4  23.7  18.1  28.1  25.9  24.3  21.2  24.9 
Taiwan 
I/GNP  23.2  27.9  28.8  30.1  28.3  26.8  25.6  n.a. 
S/GNP  28.1  29.8  30.4  26.0  30.2  30.2  32.5  n.a. 
CA/GNP  2.4  0.6  -7.9  -3.1  2.6  5.1  6.1  n.a. 
D/GNP  18.8  9.4  13.4  16.1  13.7  5.8  -1.9  n.a. 
Thailand 
I/GNP  22.8  23.6  21.8  22.2  21.8  25.2  24.6  26.2 
S/GNP  22.1  23.8  26.5  23.4  22.1  22.9  24.6  23.6 
CA/GNP  -2.5  -2.0  1.6  -2.1  -1.3  -3.3  -2.1  -4.5 




I/GNP  20.4  22.6  22.3  22.7  22.7  21.8  n.a.  n.a. 
S/GNP  20.6  21.9  24.0  20.4  21.2  21.9  n.a.  n.a. 
CA/GNP  -1.8  -3.1  -4.2  -4.5  -2.6  -1.1  n.a.  n.a. 
D/GNP  8.5  19.0  16.3  18.6  20.7  20.6  n.a.  n.a. 
Sources: Calculations by the author. Data for investment, saving, GNP,  and current account-Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; Net  debt-Organisation  for  Economic Co- 
operation and Development,  Development Cooperation:  1977 Review (Paris: OECD,  1977); saving rate 
for Brazil and Mexico, without adjusting for inflation-Edmar  Bacha and Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, "Finan- 
cial Markets: A View from the Semi-Periphery,"  paper presented at the International Seminar on External 
Financial Relations and Their Impact on the Latin American Economies (Santiago, Chile, March 1981), 
table 12, p. 53. 
n.a. Not available. 
a.  I/GNP  is calculated  as  fixed  investment,  If,  divided  by  GNP;  S/GNP  is (GNP  +  R  -  C  -  G)/GNP, 
where C is consumption; and CA/GNP  is (GNP  +  R  -  C  -  If  -  I8  -  G)/GNP,  where I8  is inventory 
investment. GNP is corrected  for the inflation bias by adding to it the capital gains on outstanding net debt, 
where net debt is defined as gross debt minus foreign exchange reserves. To obtain net debt a benchmark 
is used from the OECD Development  Cooperation:  1977 Review, which gives gross debt at the end of 1975. 
We subtract from this the 1975 year-end foreign exchange reserves of the International Monetary Fund. 
The time series is derived by applying the perpetual inventory method to  this benchmark. The annual 
current  account deficits minus net foreign direct investment inflows are cumulated from the point at which 
1975 =  0, and the series is scaled up by the 1975 net debt. The result is an end-of-year net debt series, 
DN. To obtain average debt over a year, the expression 0.5(DV  +  DA' ) is used. This average net debt is 
multiplied by the annual U.S.  inflation rate, measured as the fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter  change 
in the GNP deflator. The result is added to GNP. 
The totals for the LDCs in the last three rows are calculated as (2I)/(2GNP),  (2S)/(2GNP),  (2CA)/ 
(2GNP), where the summations are over the nine countries, and I, S, CA, and GNP are converted to U.S. 
dollars, using the annual average exchange rate. 
b. The average is taken over all available years through 1979. 
c.  An alternative measure of the saving rate for Brazil and Mexico, not adjusted for inflation, is given 
in Bacha and Diaz-Alejandro, "Financial Markets: A View from the Semi-Periphery,"  table 12, p. 53. 
The rates for Brazil are 21.1 for 1960-64, 21.8 for 1965-69, 23.8 for 1970-74, and 22.3 for 1975-78; the 
rates for Mexico are 17.3 for 1960-64, 19.4 for 1965-69, 19.1 for 1970-74, and 21.3 for 1975-77. 236  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1981 
Table 9. Saving,  Investment,  and  the Current  Account,  Developed  Countries,  1965-79a 
Percent 
Country and  Average 
itemb  1965-73  1974-79  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
United  States 
I/GNP  17.8  17.1  17.5  16.1  16.2  17.0  17.8  17.7 
S/GNP  18.7  17.8  18.7  16.8  17.2  17.4  18.1  18.4 
CA/GNP  0.0  0.0  0.1  1.2  0.3  -0.7  -0.7  0.0 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  1.4  1.7  1.8  1.9  n.a.  n.a. 
United 
Kingdom 
I/GNP  18.5  18.6  20.0  19.4  18.8  18.0  18.0  17.6 
S/GNP  19.8  18.2  17.5  16.4  18.6  19.1  19.1  18.2 
CA/GNP  0.4  -1.2  -4.0  -1.6  -0.9  -0.1  0.4  -0.9 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  4.4  7.6  10.1  9.8  9.3  n.a. 
Austria 
f/GNP  27.2  26.3  28.2  26.8  26.1  26.4  25.3  25.2 
S/GNP  28.6  24.7  29.2  25.4  23.7  21.5  23.3  24.9 
CA/GNP  -0.5  -2.9  -1.4  -0.9  -3.7  -6.3  -2.5  -2.6 
Belgium 
I/GNP  21.3  21.4  22.2  22.0  21.5  21.2  21.0  20.6 
S/GNP  25.0  21.5  25.3  22.2  21.9  20.7  20.2  18.7 
CA/GNP  2.5  -0.4  0.9  0.8  0.0  -0.8  -1.0  -2.3 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  n.a. 
Denmark 
I/GNP  24.6  23.0  24.6  21.6  23.9  23.0  22.8  22.2 
S/GNP  23.3  20.3  22.7  19.9  20.2  20.1  20.5  18.3 
CA/GNP  -2.1  -3.3  -2.9  -1.4  -4.6  -3.7  -2.7  -4.5 
France 
I/GNP  23.4  22.6  24.2  23.2  23.2  22.2  21.4  21.2 
S/GNP  25.3  23.1  24.3  23.0  22.7  22.5  22.8  23.0 
CA/GNP  -0.3  -0.6  -2.3  0.0  -1.7  -0.8  0.8  0.2 
Germany 
I/GNP  24.7  21.3  21.9  20.7  20.6  20.7  21.3  22.6 
S/GNP  27.1  23.2  25.2  21.6  22.7  22.7  23.4  24.0 
CA/GNP  1.0  1.0  2.7  1.0  0.9  0.8  1.4  -0.7 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  0.6  1.0  1.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Italy 
I/GNP  20.8  20.0  22.4  20.6  20.1  19.6  18.7  18.7 
S/GNP  23.4  22.1  21.9  20.1  22.2  22.6  22.4  23.2 
CA/GNP  1.4  -0.2  -4.7  -0.3  -1.5  1.1  2.4  1.6 
Norway 
I/GNP  27.7  33.7  31.0  34.6  37.0  38.0  32.9  28.4 
S/GNP  27.7  26.2  29.3  27.0  25.7  22.9  24.7  27.8 
CA/GNP  -1.0  -8.0  -4.8  -8.6  -12.1  -14.3  -5.5  -2.3 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  8.6  8.6  11.2  16.4  12.4  n.a. Jeffrey D. Sachs  237 
Table 9 (continued) 
Country and  Average 
itemb  1965-73  1974-79  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
Sweden 
I/GNP  22.3  20.7  21.9  21.0  20.9  20.9  19.5  20.0 
S/GNP  23.4  20.0  22.8  24.0  21.1  17.2  17.6  17.5 
CA/GNP  0.3  -1.6  -1.3  -0.5  -2.2  -2.7  -0.3  -2.7 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  0.6  n.a. 
Canada 
I/GNP  21.8  23.3  23.2  24.2  23.5  23.1  22.7  22.9 
S/GNP  22.7  22.1  24.6  21.2  22.3  21.2  20.6  22.7 
CA/GNP  0.0  -2.0  -1.0  -2.9  -2.0  -2.1  -2.2  -2.0 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  5.8  6.4  7.6  8.0  7.2  n.a. 
Japan 
I/GNP  34.9  31.6  34.8  32.2  31.0  30.1  30.2  31.6 
S/GNP  38.4  32.9  36.4  32.5  32.3  32.3  32.5  31.8 
CA/GNP  1.3  0.3  -1.0  -0.1  0.7  1.6  1.7  -0.9 
Finland 
I/GNP  26.3  27.4  30.1  31.5  28.1  27.1  23.9  23.7 
S/GNP  27.5  25.3  30.1  25.6  23.8  23.4  23.4  25.1 
CA/GNP  -1.2  -2.7  -5.3  -7.9  -3.9  -0.5  1.9  -0.5 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.3  n.a.  n.a. 
Australia 
I/GNP  25.8  23.0  23.0  23.4  23.2  23.0  22.9  22.3 
S/GNP  25.0  21.8  24.0  22.3  22.2  21.0  19.5  22.1 
CA/GNP  -1.7  -2.3  -3.3  -0.7  -1.6  -2.8  -3.6  -1.7 
Netherlands 
I/GNP  24.8  21.0  21.6  20.8  19.2  20.9  21.5  21.7 
S/GNP  27.3  23.0  27.6  23.0  23.5  22.2  21.3  20.6 
CA/GNP  0.9  1.1  3.1  2.4  3.0  0.6  -1.1  -1.5 
Im/I  n.a.  n.a.  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.2  n.a. 
Total 
I/GNP  21.6  21.3  22.2  21.0  20.8  20.9  21.4  21.5 
S/GNP  23.1  22.0  23.3  21.0  21.4  21.5  22.2  22.2 
CA/GNP  0.3  -0.2  -0.6  0.2  -0.3  -0.4  0.1  -0.5 
Sources: Current account balance-Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and Development, Main 
Economic  Indicators; GNP and fixed capital formation for all countries except the United States-Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics; U.S.  fixed capital formation and the fixed 
capital formation in the mining and quarrying sector-OECD,  National Accounts of  OECD Countries, 
1950-1978 (Paris: OECD, 1980) and recent supplements. 
n.a. Not available. 
a.  For all countries national saving is defined as the current account, CA, plus total investment, where 
total investment is the sum of gross fixed capital formation If and inventory investment. Gross fixed capital 
formation is expressed as a proportion of GNP and denoted by I/GNP;  and 1- is fixed capital formation 
in the mining and quarrying sector. 
The  totals  in  the  last  three  rows  are  calculated  as  (21)/(2GNP),  (2S)/(2GNP),  (2CA)/(2GNP),  where 
the summations are over the fifteen countries, and 1,  S,  CA, GNP are converted to U.S.  dollars, using 
the annual average exchange rate. 
b.  No data are available on I-/I  for Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Australia, and the total 
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WORLD  INVESTMENT  SHIFTS 
The investment performance of  this period represents a shift in the 
locus of new investment in the world economy. The third row of table 10 
shows the share of gross fixed capital formation undertaken in the ten 
LDCs  as a fraction of the total investment of the twenty-five countries. 
The ratio rises significantly after 1973, after climbing slowly through the 
1960s and early 1970s. The LDC share of GNP also rose but not enough 
to account for the rise in investment share. 
To a significant but variable extent, the sharp rise in investment was 
encouraged by  official development programs. The  literature on  these 
programs is extensive, including overview discussions presented in re- 
ports by OECD, UNCTAD,  and Brookings.'8 It is widely believed that 
there has been a rise in receptiveness to foreign investment, political sta- 
bility, and domestic economic reform in many of these economies, with a 
resulting rise in the profitability of physical investment. The OECD report 
describes the successes of the newly industrialising countries in attracting 
foreign direct investment in the 1970s, with ten of those countries, led by 
Mexico  and Brazil, now accounting for 34 percent of the total stock of 
private direct foreign investment by developed countries in LDCs.  The 
heralded policy  shift from a strategy of  import substitution to  export 
promotion in many of the economies has been accompanied by a liberali- 
zation of foreign capital inflows. 
In addition to the favorable developments within the LDCs,  a signifi- 
cant worsening of investment opportunities in the developed economies 
18. See the Organisation  for Economic Co-operation  and Development, The Im- 
pact  of  the  Newly  Industrialising  Countries  on  Production  and  Trade  in  Manu- 
factures  (Paris:  OECD,  1979);  United  Nations  Development Program/United 
Nations Conference  on Trade and Development, "The Balance of Payments Adjust- 
ment Process in Developing Countries: Report to  the Group of  Twenty-Four," 
Project Int/75/015,  January  2, 1979; and William R. Cline and Sidney Weintraub, 
Economic  Stabilization  in  Developing  Countries  (Brookings  Institution,  1981). 
From the International  Seminar on External Financial Relations and their Impact 
on the Latin American Economies (Santiago, Chile, March 1981), see Albert Fish- 
low, "Latin  American External Debt: Problem or Solution?"  Pedro Malan, "Finan- 
cial Integration with the World Economy: The Brazilian Case"; Roberto Frenkel, 
"Financial  Liberalization  and Capital Flows: The Case of Argentina";  and Ricardo 
Ffrench-Davis  and Jose Pablo Arellano, "Financia  Liberalization  and Foreign Debt: 
The Chilean Experience, 1978-80." os  oo  =  X  o  ^  w 
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during the 1970s contributed to a reduction in world real interest rates 
and to ready access to capital for the developing countries. As a recent 
study by the International Monetary Fund  correctly points out:  "The 
1974-75  recession reduced lending opportunities in the industrial coun- 
tries, so that banks were willing to maintain their lending to the develop- 
ing world, and at the same time real interest rates were low enough to 
keep debt service requirements from becoming too onerous.  "19 
Several developments contributed to the weakening of investment by 
developed economies. First, the post-World War II investment boom in 
many OECD  economies  had reached steeply diminishing marginal re- 
turns in the early 1970s.  The technological gap between most European 
countries and the United States had been substantially closed, while the 
growth in their effective labor supply slowed as the process of transferring 
labor from surplus sectors was  completed.  Developments  in  Japanese 
investment have been described in these same terms by many observers.20 
Second,  a sharp squeeze in profits (exceeding  the effects of  capital 
deepening)  apparently affected most  of  the  OECD  economies  in  the 
1970s.  As  Perry, Gordon,  and I  have documented in  previous BPEA 
studies, real wage growth accelerated sharply in the early 1970s in most 
countries except the United States, and did not moderate greatly in the 
19. International Monetary Fund, "International  Capital Markets: Recent De- 
velopments  and Short-Term  Prospects"  Occasional  Paper 1 (IMF, September  1980), 
p. 5. Similarly,  in the OECD  study,  The Impact  of  the Newly  Industrialising  Coun- 
tries, it is noted: "The abundance  of investable funds created by the OPEC surplus 
and by depressed  private demand for credit in the OECD area facilitated the financ- 
ing of productive investment  in promising countries outside the OECD, notably the 
NICs and the Eastern  Bloc." 
20.  See, for example, OECD Economic Survey: Japan (Paris: OECD, 1977), 
p. 27, in which it is stated: 
Looking at medium-term  productivity  trends, it may be worth noting that a struc- 
tural shift seems also to have occurred since the beginning of the seventies. Up to 
the end of the sixties, the efficiency of capital remained exceptionally high, despite 
the very rapid rate of capital accumulation. In recent years, however, the produc- 
tivity of  private capital has declined considerably, reflecting important structural 
changes in the composition of investment....  As noted, in recent years the tech- 
nological gap between Japan and other major industrial  countries has been largely 
closed, which considerably reduces the scope for importing ready made foreign 
know-how. The substantial slowdown in growth of  the private capital stock, its 
changing composition and the parallel decline of  productivity have resulted in a 
marked deceleration of the growth of  productive capacity, all the more so, since 
deep changes in the structure  of relative prices entailed by the sharp rise in oil prices 
have contributed  to increase  the obsolescence of certain equipment. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  241 
first years following the energy price increases in  1973-74.21  The result 
was a rise in labor's share of income, wL/GNP,  and a fall in the before- 
tax rate of return to corporate capital in many economies. 
Table 11 summarizes these developments in labor's share and com- 
pares them with developments in five LDCs for which UN data are avail- 
able. The consistent rise in labor's share in almost all OECD economies 
is apparently unmatched in LDCs. For every OECD economy the share 
of labor for the most recent year included is greater than the 1969 value. 
The opposite is true for the LDCs; only two of the five show an increase 
during the same period. 
A third factor in the investment shift is the boom in raw materials in- 
vestment generally, which has been occurring largely in the nonoil LDCs. 
The post  1972-74  rise in raw materials investments was spurred by the 
intense desire of many corporations and governments of developed coun- 
tries to hedge against future embargoes of primary products following the 
1973  oil embargo. It is extremely difficult to obtain aggregate data for 
sectoral capital formation in the LDCs to measure this effect. It should 
be noted, however, that the majority of U.S. foreign direct investment in 
this period was not in the mining or petroleum sectors, but in manufactur- 
ing. In  1972,  50 percent of U.S.  direct investment in the LDCs was in 
petroleum and mining, and 26 percent was in manufacturing. From 1972 
to 1979, the petroleum and mining assets fell by 23 percent (in current 
dollars), due in part to expropriation, while the book value of U.S. manu- 
facturing assets in LDCs rose by 143 percent. Thus in 1979 the mining 
and petroleum interests accounted for 20 percent of U.S. investments in 
developing countries, and manufacturing for 34 percent.22 
In  many  developing  economies  the  rise  in  investment  rates  was 
matched by  higher saving rates. Such a correlation is  not  implied by 
models with perfect capital mobility. Restrictions on capital flows, how- 
ever, cause a rise in home  interest rates relative to world rates and a 
partial financing of  new  investment from domestic  saving rather than 
from international capital markets. One can speculate that rising saving 
21.  See George L. Perry, "Determinants  of Wage Inflation around the World," 
BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 403-35; Robert J. Gordon, "World  Inflation and Monetary Ac- 
commodation  in Eight Countries,"  BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 409-68; and Jeffrey  D. Sachs, 
"Wages,  Profits, and Macroeconomic Adjustment: A Comparative Study," BPEA, 
2:1979, pp. 269-319. 
22. See Survey of Current  Business, vol. 53 (September 1973), pp. 26-27,  and 
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Table 11. Share  of Labor  in GNP, Developed  Countries  and  Selected  LDCs, 1965-78a 
Percent 
LDCs and  Average 
developed 
countries  1965-73 1974-78  1969  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 
LDCs 
Brazil  38  38b  37c  38  37  39  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Colombia  38  34  38  35  34  35  33  33  34 
Korea  32  33  32  30  30  31  32  34  37 
Mexico  37  38  34  37  37  38  41  38  38 
Thailand  25  24  25  23  23  24  24  24  24 
Developed  countries 
United States  61  62  61  62  62  61  61  61  62 
United Kingdom  59  62  56  59  63  65  62  60  60 
Austria  49  54  49  51  52  54  54  55  56 
Belgium  50  57  49  53  55  57  57  58  58 
Denmark  51  54  50  51  55  56  54  54  54 
France  48  54  48  50  52  54  54  54  54 
Germany  53  56  51  55  57  56  56  56  55 
Italy  51  56  51  53  53  57  56  57  56 
Netherlands  56  59  55  57  59  61  59  59  59 
Norway  54  59  55  61  57  59  60  61  60 
Canada  55  57  55  55  55  57  57  58  57 
Japan  44  53  42  48  50  53  54  54  53 
Finland  50  54d  50  51  51  54  56  55  n.a. 
Australia  57  61  56  60  65  62  60  60  60 
Sweden  60  66  60  61  62  64  68  71  70 
Sources: Data for the LDCs are from the United Nations, National Income Account Statistics, various 
years; for the developed countries, from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
National Accounts  of OECD Countries,  1950-1978 (Paris: OECD, 1980). 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  Calculated as labor compensation divided by total domestic factor incomes. 
b. For 1974-75. 
c.  For 1970. 
d. For 1974-77. 
rates in the LDCs  reflect in part the rising profitability of investment. 
Bacha and Diaz-Alejandro point to the role of liberalization of the do- 
mestic financial sector as a key to the rising saving rate.23  Whatever the 
explanation,  the  greater LDC  investment cannot  be  due  solely  to  an 
exogenous rise in domestic saving, because under almost any assumptions 
23.  See Edmar Bacha and Carlos Diaz-Alejandro,  "Financial Markets: A View 
from the Semi-Periphery,"  paper presented  at the International  Seminar  on External 
Financial Relations (Santiago, March 1981), pp. 51-57.  One key reform was the 
introduction  of indexed bonds as vehicles for domestic saving in some countries. Jeffrey D. Sachs  243 
an exogenous shift in saving would improve rather than worsen the cur- 
rent account. 
Chile, the country with the sharpest drop in saving rates in the sample, 
is an exporter of primary commodities, particularly copper. Copper prices 
showed a boom in  1973  and then went into a precipitous decline. The 
price of  Chilean copper exports relative to  the U.S.  export unit value 
index fell by half between 1973 and 1975.24 Assuming that the decline in 
copper prices was perceived as temporary, the model would predict a fall 
in  the national saving rate matched by  current account deficits, as is 
observed. 
THE  LDC  "DEBT  PROBLEM" 
The manageability of the LDC  debt has been the subject of  a large 
literature in recent years.25  If my analysis is correct, much of the growth 
in LDC debt reflects increased investment and should not pose a problem 
of repayment. The major borrowers have accumulated debt in the con- 
text of rising or stable, but not falling, saving rates. This is particularly 
true for Brazil and Mexico, which together account for about 40 percent 
of the net bank liabilities of the LDCs and about 25 percent of total debt 
of the LDCs.26 The growth in debt might be a cause for concern if bor- 
rowing reflected an attempt to  maintain consumption at unsustainable 
levels after the oil price increases. In that case, the debt would presage a 
fall in consumption that might prove to be politically  or economically 
untenable and result in default. In fact, the current account reflects rising 
24.  See  International  Monetary  Fund,  International  Financial  Statistics,  vol.  34 
(February 1981), series 76cd and 74, pp. 110 and 408, respectively. 
25.  Among the many studies on this topic, see International Monetary Fund, 
"International  Capital Markets";  many articles in World  Development, vol. 7 (Feb- 
ruary 1979), including Ariel Buira Seira, "The World Economy, External Debt and 
Prospects  for Development Financing,"  pp. 125-33,  and Miguel S. Wionczek, "The 
LDC External Debt and the Euromarkets:  The Impressive Record and the Uncer- 
tain Future,"  pp. 175-87; "Access of Developing Countries to International  Finan- 
cial  Markets,"  in  OECD,  Financial  Market  Trends,  vol.  13  (February  1980),  pp. 
91-108; M. S. Mendelsohn,  Money on the Move (McGraw-Hill, 1980), particularly 
chaps. 17-20; and Bacha and Diiaz-Alejandro,  "Financial  Markets";  and OECD, "Ex- 
ternal Indebtedness  of  Developing Countries: Present Situation and Future Pros- 
pects,"  1979. 
26.  For bank net claims, see International  Monetary Fund, "International  Capi- 
tal Markets,"  p. 9; for total disbursed  debt, see OECD, Development Cooperation, 
1980 (Paris: OECD, 1980), p. 221. 244  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1981 
Table 12.  Average Spreads of External Borrowing Costs over London Inter-Bank 
Offered Rate, LIBOR,  1974-79 
Percentage points 
Item  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
All LDCs  1.13  1.68  1.72  1.55  1.20  0.87 
Typical industrial country 
(France)  0.58  1.42  1.09  0.92  0.63  0.36 
Difference  0.55  0.27  0.63  0.63  0.57  0.51 
LIBOR  rate (percent 
per year)  11.32  7.74  6.26  6.54  9.48  12.12 
Addendum 
Brazila  1.1  1.8  2.0  2.0  1.7  0.9 
Source: All data except for that on  Brazil are from World Bank,  World Developmenlt  Report, 1980, 
table 3.5, p. 27. The Brazilian data are cited in Albert Fishlow, "Latin American External Debt: Problem 
or Solution?" paper presented at the International Seminar on  External Financial Relations and Their 
Impact on the Latin American Economies (Santiago, Chile, March 1981), table 2, p. 10. 
a.  The 1980 value is 1.75. 
investment rates in excess of rising or stable saving rates. As long as the 
investment projects undertaken have a positive present value at the bor- 
rowing rate of interest, the investing country should experience a rising 
consumption path over time. 
Econometric evidence supports the view that higher investment rates 
reduce the likelihood  of  default for given levels  of  total  debt. Kharas 
also reports econometric evidence that default probabilities have been a 
strongly declining function of I/GNP  for a large sample of countries in 
recent years.27  His evidence suggests that the strong investment perfor- 
mance of the large borrowers should help to explain why interest rate 
premiums have  not  risen for  syndicated Euromarket loans  to  LDCs, 
despite the huge increases in LDC  debt. Table  12 documents that the 
spread-the  differential between Euromarket borrowing rates and the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)-has  narrowed sharply since 
1975 and 1976. The movements in the spread hardly seem to characterize 
a market paralyzed by the fear of default and excessive exposure. 
As a further check on the role of high investment rates in facilitating 
capital flows, I fit a cross-section regression of the average 1979  inter- 
est differential for thirty LDCs.  The interest differential was regressed 
27. Homi J. Kharas, "Optimal Debt Accumulation by Less Developed Coun- 
tries-Theory and Practice"  (Ph.D. dissertation,  Harvard  University,  June 1980). Jeffrey  D. Sachs  245 
on  (CA/GNP)78,  (I/GNP) 78,  (D/GNP)78,  and  income  per  capita, 
(GNP/L)78,  as shown below. For given CA/GNP,  increases in I/GNP 
systematically reduce the spread: 28 
(i  -  LIBOR)79  =  1.35  -  1.83(IjGNP)78-  2.49(CAjGNP)78, 
(6.3)  (-2.0)  (-2.3) 
RF  =  0.16; standard  error =  0.29. 
or 
(i  -  LIBOR)79  =  1.38  -  1.89(IjGNP)78  -  3.17(CAjGNP)78 
(5.7)  (-2.2)  -(3.2) 
-  0.009(GNPjL)78 +  0.0008(DjGNP)78, 
(-1.4)  (0.2) 
2=  0. 35; standard  error = 0. 26. 
Additional evidence of the importance of investment to credit worthi- 
ness is the fact that most of the major reschedulings in recent years have 
occurred after a rise in current account deficits following a sharp drop in 
S/GNP,  and almost never following a rise in I/GNP.  Turkey appears to 
be the significant exception to this pattern among the six countries shown 
in table 13.  (In the case of Peru, the debt renegotiation began in  1976 
and 1977,  when S/GNP  was very low; it was concluded in 1978,  after 
S/GNP  had substantially recovered.) One can surmise that creditors pull 
back from a routine rollover of debt when the borrowing appears incon- 
sistent with a reasonable path of future consumption, as is the case when 
heavy borrowing reflects a drop in  domestic  saving rates. Indeed,  re- 
schedulings are frequently linked to programs of the International Mone- 
tary Fund that call for increased saving and investment rates.29 
On the pessimistic side,  there may be  financial difficulty for  many 
LDCs if the high real interest rates of  1981  continue. This is a particu- 
larly serious problem because most bank loans to LDCs  for long-term 
investment projects have a provision that adjusts interest costs on out- 
standing debt at fixed intervals to a predetermined spread over LIBOR.30 
28. The data on spreads for 1979 are from Euromoney (February 1980), pp. 
40-48. The regressions  included the subset of the listed LDCs for which public bor- 
rowing exceeded $100 million in 1979. In this regression CA is exclusive of official 
transfers.  The numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
29.  I am indebted to Richard Cooper for this point. 
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Table 13.  The Current Account, Saving, and Investment in Countries with a Debt 




Country and  Average,  resched- 
item  1970-73  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  uling 
Chile 
I/GNP  13.2  12.6  10.5  9.0  9.2  n.a. 
S/GNP  11.5  12.9  -0.2  7.0  5.9  n.a.  1975 
CA/GNP  -2.9  -0.8  -6.7  1.4  -3.3  n.a. 
Gabon 
I/GNP  n.a.  55.8  91.5  n.a.  67.1  n.a. 
S/GNP  n.a.  63.2  47.8  n.a.  50.7  n.a.  1978 
CA/GNP  n.a.  7.4  -43.6  n.a.  -16.4  n.a. 
Peru 
I/GNP  12.7  15.3  17.5  16.9  14.9  14.5 
S/GNP  15.6  13.3  9.7  10.9  9.2  15.3  1978 
CA/GNP  1.0  -5.8  -10.1  -7.1  -6.2  0.2 
Sierre Leone 
I/GNP  13.2  12.0  13.4  12.7  11.9  12.8 
S/GNP  13.4  16.3  6.3  4.6  8.2  7.7  1976 
CA/GNP  -0.4  0.2  -9.7  -7.8  -6.0  -4.7 
Turkey 
I/GNP  17.0  17.7  18.9  22.6  22.7  20.1 
S/GNP  22.8  21.9  21.8  21.7  21.3  22.6  1978 
CA/GNP  5.0  2.8  -0.5  -1.9  -3.6  -0.1 
Zaire 
I/GNP  28.4  32.0  28.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
S/GNP  21.5  19.0  9.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1976, 
CA/GNP  -10.8  -13.0  -22.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1977 
Sources: All data except that for Turkey are from the International Monetary Fund, International  Fi- 
natncial Statistics. The definitions of S, I, and  CA are the same as those in tables 8 and 9, although no 
adjustment for inflation is made for these countries. The data for Turkey are from the Organisation for 
Economic  Co-operation  and  Development,  National  Accounts  of  OECD  Countries,  1950-1978  (Paris: 
OECD, 1980), and are similarly defined. 
n.a.  Not available. 
Projects that were profitable at the low  real interest rates of  1974-77 
may now have a negative present value. 
On the optimistic side, for many LDCs  total debt greatly overstates 
bank exposure because LDCs have substantial bank assets offsetting their 
bank liabilities. Moreover, the LDCs may be able to expand borrowing Jeffrey  D. Sachs  247 
in the Eurobond markets, thereby diversifying the holdings of LDC debt 
and reducing bank exposure. In the same way, the growth of European 
bank lending to Mexico and Brazil may alleviate the fear that U.S. bank 
loans are too highly concentrated in these countries, which has occasion- 
ally led to spreads over LIBOR on Brazilian loans of more than 2 per- 
cent.3" 
CURRENT  ACCOUNT  CHANGES  IN  OECD  COUNTRIES 
For the developed economies the data are available to  compare the 
dependence on oil imports and current account movements in the 1970s. 
According to the theory developed here, a permanent oil price rise should 
not cause differential current account behavior in oil exporting and im- 
porting countries (abstracting from investment behavior)  while a tem- 
porary shock should. There does in fact appear to be a systematic relation 
between oil dependence and deficits among the oil-importing countries, 
although that relation appears weak after 1975. It also appears that shifts 
in domestic investment rates are as important as oil-import dependence in 
interpreting recent current account movements. The behavior of invest- 
ment helps to explain U.S. deficits whereas Germany and Japan had sur- 
pluses in 1977-78;  the striking increases in deficits of the energy-export- 
ing countries, Canada and Norway; and the very different current account 
behavior  after  the  1974  and  1979  oil  shocks  in  the  largest  OECD 
economies. 
As shown in the data on saving and investment in table 9, I/GNP  de- 
clined between  1965-73  and 1974-79  in ten of fifteen countries. Only 
in Belgium, Canada, Finland, Norway,  and the United  Kingdom were 
rates of gross fixed capital formation maintained or increased. The rows 
labeled P11/I, showing the share of mining and energy investment as a 
proportion of total investment, help to explain this divergence. Canada, 
Norway, and the United Kingdom are three of the four countries listed 
31. See "The Great Brazilian Tightrope,"  Euromoney  (January 1980), pp. 50- 
68, and more recent issues of  Euromoney.  On the question of  bank loans, see 
Edmar Bacha and Diaz-Alejandro, "Financial Markets: A  View from the Semi- 
Periphery,"  p.  34.  In  December 1977  non-U.S. bank claims against Brazil and 
Mexico were $19.7 billion out of $43.7 billion (45 percent) in total claims against 
these countries.  By June 1979 the non-U.S. bank claims had risen to $35 billion out 
of $59.9 billion (58 percent) in total claims. 248  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1 981 
for which mining and energy investments account for more than 2 percent 
of gross fixed capital formation.32  The energy price increases after 1973 
led  to  a major expansion of  their energy production, which sustained 
overall investment rates. 
These energy investments were largely financed through foreign capital 
inflows, as the model of the current account predicts. Norway is the out- 
standing case. After averaging 28 percent in 1965-73,  its I/GNP  rose a 
full 10 percentage points in the next five years, with a substantial rise in 
the share of investment devoted to energy and energy-related projects, in- 
cluding the oil and gas pipeline between Norway and West Germany.33 
The current account deficit rose about as much as investment. National 
saving rates did not have to rise, nor other investment rates fall, to allow 
for the exploitation of the North Sea oil. Major projects in the pipeline, 
oil production, and petrochemical plants were completed in  1978,  and 
real fixed capital formation fell 16.1 percent between 1977 and 1979. The 
current account deficit disappeared also, falling to a mere 2.2 percent of 
GDP in 1979. It must be emphasized that despite Norway's extraordinary 
CA deficits by OECD  standards, reaching over  13 percent of  GDP  in 
1977, international capital markets remained open to Norwegian borrow- 
ing without increases in relative interest rates and without sharp deprecia- 
tion of the Norwegian krona. 
The importance of investment in OECD current account determination 
may be documented statistically. First, it should be noted that, although 
there are important changes in CA/GNP  over time, there is also a con- 
sistent ordering of countries in relative current account positions. Many 
countries, particularly the smaller European economies, have been regu- 
larly in deficit since 1960, while others, such as Germany and Japan, have 
been  typically in  surplus. The  correlation between  CA/GNP  for  the 
1965-73  subperiod and for 1974-79,  across countries, is r =  0.65. More- 
over, with the important exception of Japan, there is a strong negative 
relation between the investment rates and current account positions of 
the countries. The countries that are typically in deficit have, on average, 
32. Australia is the fourth, though apparently  no post-1974 data on Australian 
sectoral investment  are available from the OECD. 
33.  Mining and quarrying  investments accounted for about 2.4 percent of total 
investments  in 1970 and 16.6 percent at their peak in 1977. Adding transport  invest- 
ment, which includes the pipeline, the shares are 23.0 percent in  1970 and 34.4 
percent in  1977. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  249 
much higher investment rates than the surplus countries.34  For example, 
the simple correlation of  (I/GNP)74 79 and  (CA/GNP)7479  is  -0.61. 
Excluding Japan, the correlation is -0.86. 
Table 14 reports regressions testing the importance of shifts in invest- 
ment and saving and oil dependence in explaining changes in the current 
account. 
In separate cross-country regressions of  [(CA/GNP)74  79  -  (CA/ 
GNP)  68-73] on changes in investment rates and on changes in saving rates, 
the investment rate variable enters significantly and explains 72 percent 
of the cross-country variance. The shifts in saving explain virtually none 
of the variance, and are in fact negatively correlated with A(CA/GNP). 
There is no significant linkage between A(CA/GNP)  and pre-1973  oil 
dependence, as seen in equations 14-3  and 14-4.  When Norway is re- 
moved from the sample, A(I/GNP)  remains an important explanatory 
variable, while Moil/GNP  rises slightly in importance. Other regressions 
for all countries, not shown, demonstrate that the effect of A(I/GNP) 
holds for various subperiods (for  instance,  [(CA/GNP)76  78  -  (CA/ 
GNP),68-73]  is  closely  related  to  [(I/GNP)76-78  -  (I/GNP)68-73]),  and 
is not merely a reflection of the 1974-75  recession. 
A puzzle emerges when one examines the subgroup of oil-importing 
countries, excluding Australia, Canada, Norway, and the United King- 
dom.  Without these  countries, A(CA/GNP)  shows  a  strong negative 
correlation with (Moil/GNP)68 73, as seen in equation 14-6. Specifically, 
a 1 percentage point greater oil dependence in 1968-73  corresponds to a 
drop in (CA/GNP)  of fully 0.9 percentage point in 1974-79.  Higher in- 
vestment rates in the oil-dependent economies do,  not seem to explain this 
correlation, as shown in equation 14-7. On closer examination, however, 
the correlation between A(CA/GNP)  and Moil/GNP  comes primarily 
from the first years after the oil shock, as comparison of equations 14-8 
and 14-10  shows. Also,  in the  1974-75  period, A(I/GNP)  dominates 
34. For further discussion, which shows that smaller European economies are 
characterized by  relatively high I/GNP  and  low  CA/GNP,  see  Jeffrey Sachs 
"Aspects  of the Current  Account Behavior of the OECD Economies,"  presented at 
the fifth International  Conference of the University of Paris-Dauphine  on Money 
and International  Monetary Problems, June 15 to 17, 1981. Japan's small surplus 
and high investment  rates probably reflect a policy of tight capital controls until the 
mid-1970s. The controls were designed to channel the high Japanese saving rates 
into domestic investment.  In the absence of controls, Japan would most likely have 
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Table 14. Equations  Explaining  the Change  in the Ratio of the Current  Account  to 
GNP, A(CA/GNP),  Selected  Countries  and Periods,  1968-79a 
Country  Period  Independent  variable 
group  and 
equation  First  Second  Moil/GNP  A(I/GNP)  A(S/GNP)  J?2 
All countries 
14-1  1968-73  1974-79  ...  -0.61  ...  0.72 
(-6.2) 
14-2  1968-73  1974-79  ...  ...  -0.34  0.00 
(-1.0) 
14-3  1968-73  1974-79  -0.61  ...  ...  0.04 
(-1.27) 
14-4  1968-73  1974-79  -0.30  -0.59  ...  0.73 




14-5  1968-73  1974-79  -0.32  -0.33  ...  0.37 
(-1.5)  (-2.6) 
Oil-importing 
countries 
14-6  1968-73  1974-79  -0.89  ...  ...  0.37 
(-2.8) 
14-7  1968-73  1974-79  -0.70  -0.21  ...  0.38 
(-1.97)  (-1.1) 
14-8  1968-73  1974-75  -1.74  ...  ...  0.29 
(-2.49) 
14-9  1968-73  1974-75  -0.56  -0.71  ...  0.71 
(-1.0)  (-3.5) 
14-10  1968-73  1976-78  -0.43  ...  ...  -0.17 
(-0.75) 
14-11  1968-73  1976-78  -0.20  -0.28  ...  -0.19 
(-0.32)  (-0.90) 
Sources: Calculations by the author. 
a.  The dependent variable is average (CA/GNP)period  2  minus average (CA/GNP)68-73.  The "all coun- 
tries" category in this table and the I and S are the same as those in table 9. Nonoil  countries exclude 
Australia, Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom. For all regressions, M?il/GNP is the net import 
of the standard international trade classification (SITC 3) as a percent of GNP,  with the ratio averaged 
over  1968-73.  The  variable  A(I/GNP)  is average  (1/GNP)period  2  minus  average  (I/GNP)68-73;  the  variable 
A(S/GNP)  is average  (S/GNP)period  2  minus  average  (S/GNP)68-73.  The  numbers  in  parentheses  are  t- 
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MOil/GNP, as seen in 14-9. When the cyclical years immediately follow- 
ing the oil shock are deleted, as in equations 14-10 and 14-11, neither oil 
dependence  nor  investment  explains  current  accounts  among  nonoil 
economies. 
THE  SPECIAL  CASES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
GERMANY,  AND  JAPAN 
Looking at the U.S., Japanese, and German current accounts as a por- 
tion of  income conceals  their quantitative importance to  international 
capital markets. Even in 1978, the year of the largest U.S. trade and cur- 
rent account deficits-$33.8  billion  and $14  billion,  respectively-the 
U.S. deficit was no more than 0.7  percent of GNP. But the $14  billion 
reflected a large amount of borrowing from the rest of the world. The 
1978  Japanese surplus  ($16.5  billion)  more  than  matched  the  U.S. 
deficit, and the combined German ($8.7  billion)  and Japanese surpluses 
were over one and a half times the U.S. deficit. 
After the first oil shock, a deep recession coupled with a sharp drop in 
real fixed capital formation caused large surpluses in the United States, 
Germany, and Japan. Because of an exceptional fall in the before-tax rate 
of return to capital in Germany and Japan, investments in GNP fell below 
the historical trend (see table 9)  and did not begin to recover until 1979. 
As  is well known, U.S. profitability recovered substantially after 1975; 
indeed, the cyclically adjusted before-tax rate of returns to U.S.  capital 
does not appear to have fallen after the OPEC shock.35  The U.S. cyclical 
recovery was led by  an investment boom,  and the rate of  gross fixed 
capital formation as a percentage of income  returned to  the  1965-73 
average. In all three countries the rate of  growth of real fixed capital 
formation slowed after 1973,  but slowed much more markedly in Ger- 
many and Japan. Between  1965  and 1973,  real fixed capital formation 
grew 28  percent in the United States, as compared with 33  percent in 
Germany and 197 percent in Japan; between 1973 and 1978, the growth 
in these countries was 2.6 percent, zero percent, and 6.0 percent, respec- 
tively.36  National saving rates in Germany and Japan fell more than in the 
35. See Sachs, "Wages,  Profits,  and Macroeconomic  Adjustment." 
36. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, National 
Accounts  of  OECD  Countries,  1961-1978  (Paris:  OECD,  1980),  vol.  2, pp.  19,  31, 
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United  States after  1973;  the  differential investment experience  more 
than explains the relative current account movements. 
A striking comparison can be drawn between the current account re- 
sponses to the oil shocks in 1973  and in  1979.  There has been a sharp 
difference in the response of real wages to the second oil shock, with a 
corresponding difference in  investment patterns. The  1981  Economic 
Report of the President notes: 
In 1974-75 unit labor costs [outside  the United States]  rose much more than 
value-added  deflators  for manufacturing.  This implied  a sharp  rise in the labor 
share of total value added, and a corresponding  fall in the profit  share,  which 
was only gradually  restored  in subsequent  years. The squeeze  on profits  was a 
major cause of low rates of investment  in most foreign countries  during  the 
following  years.... 
In 1979-80,  the increase in unit labor costs in major foreign countries re- 
mained less than the rise in value-added  deflators,  thus giving manufacturers 
some room to absorb  increased  energy  costs without  a major  squeeze  on profit 
margins.37 
And this has been specifically true in Germany and Japan. 
For Japan: 
When the second  oil crisis hit the Japanese economy,  it was not far from the 
full  employment  situation.  .  ..  The  profit squeeze  effect,  which  could  have 
decreased  the supply  of manufactures  by as much as 13 percent,  was prevented 
from taking place because of a substantial  cut in the real wage cost. A reces- 
sion did not materialize, and, moreover, the oil-induced inflation has been 
largely avoided.38 
For Germany: 
The decline in the labor  share  in national  income since 1975, which was inter- 
rupted only in 1977, thus continued [in 1979]. This adjustment  of the wage 
share has been widely accepted, in order to increase investment  propensities 
required  to attain full employment  in the median run. Nevertheless,  the con- 
tinuation  of this process  in 1979 is remarkable,  since, contrary  to 1978, terms- 
of-trade developments  reduced considerably  the margin of distributable  na- 
tional income.39 
In line with the arguments set forth in my earlier BPEA paper, the oil 
shock of  1979 had a much smaller impact on investment than the 1974 
37.  Economic  Report  of  the President,  January  1981,  pp.  184-85. 
38. Yoichi Shinkai, "Oil Crisis and the Stagflation (or Its Absence)  in Japan," 
Discussion Paper 110  (Osaka University, Institute of  Social and Economic Re- 
search), p. 13. 
39.  OECD  Economic  Surveys:  Germany  (Paris:  OECD,  May  1980),  p. 20. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  253 
shock.  Indeed,  1979  was  a boom  year  abroad for fixed investment.40 
The result has been a swing into deficit in Germany and Japan, in contrast 
to Germany's widening surplus in  1974.  For  1981,  OECD  forecasts a 
$19 billion U.S. surplus offsetting a $17  billion combined German and 
Japanese deficit.4' 
Changes  in the Exchange  Rate and in Current  Accounts 
Rudiger Dombusch's recent survey of exchange rate models examined 
the possible theoretical links between the current account and floating 
exchange rates.42  Professional thinking about these links has gone through 
a number of stages. Keynesian models in the 1950s and 1960s focused on 
the role of exchange rate movements in closing account imbalances. In 
a world of capital immobility, a floating exchange rate e must adjust until 
CA equals zero. Mundell and Fleming introduced the opposite assump- 
tion of perfect capital mobility, severing this connection between e and 
CA. In the Mundell-Fleming model a fiscal expansion causes an exchange 
rate appreciation at the  same time that it widens the current account 
deficit. Models  of global monetarism and full-employment equilibrium 
further  weakened the e -  CA connection.43  These models underscored the 
fact that e is a nominal variable while CA is a real variable, so that there 
need be no link between the two in a world devoid of money illusion. 
Other theoretical work, particularly that of Kouri and Branson, has 
continued to stress the link between the exchange rate and the current 
account, and those views received particular prominence with the 1977- 
40.  Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Wages, Profits, and Macroeconomic Adjustment. 
41.  Cited  in Economic  Report  of  the President,  January  1981,  table  29,  p.  187. 
42.  Rudiger Dornbusch, "Exchange Rate Economics: Where Do  We Stand?" 
BPEA,  1:1980,  pp.  143-85. 
43.  Robert A. Mundell, "Capital  Mobility and Stabilization  Policy under Fixed 
and  Flexible  Exchange  Rates,"  Canadian  Journal  of  Economics  and  Political 
Science, vol. 29  (November 1963),  pp. 475-88,  reproduced in Richard E. Caves 
and  Harry  G.  Johnson,  eds.,  Readings  in International  Economics  (Irwin,  1968), 
pp. 487-99; and J. Marcus Fleming, "Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and 
Floating Exchange Rates,"  IMF Staff Papers, vol. 9 (November 1962), pp. 369-80, 
reproduced  in  Richard  N.  Cooper,  ed.,  International  Finance:  Selected  Readings 
(Penguin, 1969), pp. 291-303. 254  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1981 
78 depreciation of the dollar and the accompanying huge current account 
deficits. In a series of papers, Kouri, Branson, and others have shown how 
current account imbalances induce a reshuffling of  assets among home 
and foreign portfolios, with resulting shifts in interest rates on assets of 
different currency denominations. These interest rate fluctuations in turn 
induce changes in the exchange rate.44  In other recent work, Dornbusch 
and Fischer have stressed the wealth effects of current account deficits on 
money demand. Because a deficit implies rising indebtedness to the rest 
of the world, and perhaps falling domestic wealth, the demand for home 
money may fall if money holdings are a rising function of wealth.45  The 
fall in money demand, for a given nominal money supply, results in ex- 
change rate depreciation. In still another view linking exchange rates and 
the current account, Stockman and Mussa have argued that changes in 
nominal  exchange  rates  are  often  a  reflection  of  real  exchange  rate 
changes-that  is,  shifts  in  relative  prices  across  countries-that  are 
brought about by nonmonetary disturbances in the economy. These real 
shocks may cause current account deficits and real exchange  rate de- 
preciations, leading to a statistical correlation of the current account and 
nominal exchange rate movements.46 
These relations can be succinctly described in a simple monetary frame- 
work. The equations should be considered part of a general equilibrium 
model  and not  a self-contained theory of  the exchange rate. The  real 
exchange rate, or the inverse of the home country terms of trade, can be 
expressed  as  7r =  (eP*/P).  A fall in 7r  is a real  exchange  rate  appreciation, 
and a rise is a depreciation. The 7r is driven by shifts in the supply and 
demand for home goods relative to foreign goods. The exchange rate can 
44.  See Pentti J. K. Kouri, "The Exchange Rate and the Balance of Payments in 
the Short-Run and in the Long-Run: A Monetary Approach,"  Scandinavian  Jour- 
nal of Economics, vol. 78, no. 2 (1976),  pp. 280-304; and Pentti J. K. Kouri and 
Jorge Braga de Macedo, "Exchange Rates and the International  Adjustment Pro- 
cess," BPEA, 1:1978, pp. 111-50. An empirical implementation  of  this view is in 
William H. Branson, Hannu Halttunen and Paul Masson, "Exchange Rates in the 
Short-Run: The Dollar-Deutschemark  Rate," European Economic Review, vol. 10 
(December 1977), pp. 303-24. 
45.  See Rudiger  Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, "Exchange  Rates and the Cur- 
rent Account,"  American Economic Review, vol. 70 (December 1980), pp. 960-71. 
46.  See Mussa, "The Role of the Current  Account in Exchange Rate Dynamics"; 
and Stockman, "A Theory of  Exchange Rate Dynamics" and "Exchange Rates, 
Relative Prices, and Resource Allocation." Jef0rey  D. Sachs  255 
be written e =  T(P/P*).  Money-demand functions take the form: 
(13)  =  m(i,  Y, W),  -  =  m*(i*,  *,  W*) 
mjl  M *  <  O;  M2, M  *  >  0;  M3, M  *  >  O, 
where i is the nominal interest rate, Y is real income, and W is total wealth 
in the economy. For convenience, these functions are assumed to be of 
semilog form, 
M=  (  +  i)-  M* 
-  (1 +  i*)-Y*YW*a. 
If if is the expected return on the foreign asset in domestic currency units, 
then 
1 +  if  =  E(et+?) (1  +  i*)  e  t 
Let  p be the risk premium on the home asset, so that 
j 
=  if  1 +  i 
=  -  1~+ if' 
From  the relation e  =  7r(P/P*)  and the money-demand functions,  a 
quasi-reduced form can be written for et: 
(14)  et=  7__  E(et+1)  ](Y*)(W*) 
The final form for et depends on E(et+,),  which in turn is a function of 
expected  future  monetary  policy  and future  changes  in x,  Y,  Y*,  W and 
W*. Therefore et depends on the entire future path of exogenous  and 
policy variables. Here, it will suffice to hold E(et+,)  fixed, and to discuss 
current period  changes in  the  remaining variables.47 To  complete  the 
model, equations are needed to describe Y, Y*, W, W*, 7r,  M, M*,  and 
expectations formation. 
Equation 14 illustrates as special cases the three views of the linkage 
between the current account and the exchange rate. The Kouri-Branson 
position lies in the association of a deficit with a rise in  p, which clearly 
increases e. The primary effect of a deficit is regarded as the reduction 
47.  Suppose, for example, that it is widely anticipated  that monetary authorities 
will peg the future nominal exchange  rate. 256  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1981 
in net holdings  of foreign-denominated  assets, which raises the equilib- 
rium  spread  between  i and  if. The  Dornbusch-Fischer  approach  posits  that 
changes  in W result  from CA imbalances;  from 14 a decline in wealth 
causes  e to rise. Finally, the Mussa-Stockman  view is that a current  ac- 
count  deficit  may  be associated  with a rise in 7r,  and thus a rise in e. 
The linkages  between  e and CA are  hardly  rigid.  Purely  monetary  dis- 
turbances,  such as expected  changes  in current  M/M* or future  M/M*, 
can affect e with little impact on the current  account.  Wealth changes 
may provide a link between e and CA, but in a "perverse"  direction. 
Current  account  deficits  signify  a drop in a country's  net foreign  invest- 
ment  position  but do not necessarily  denote  a drop  in total  wealth.  It may 
well be that the wealth of countries  with deficits  is growing  faster than 
the wealth  of those with surpluses  if the deficits  reflect  a boom in home 
investment.  Moreover,  measured  effects  of wealth  on money  demand  tend 
to be small  or negligible. 
Changes  in 7r  could provide  a connection  between  CA and e, though 
not always  in the supposed  direction.  Suppose  that CA movements  are 
largely a result of investment  shocks, caused by shifting estimates  of 
future  profitability  (02  in the earlier  model). A rise in I and the resulting 
deficit  will be accompanied  by a rise  in domestic  prices  relative  to foreign 
prices,  and r will fall, if the investment  demand  is concentrated  in home 
goods. According  to 14, CA deficits  will, other  things  being  equal,  be ac- 
companied  by nominal  and  real  exchange  rate  appreciation.  If the invest- 
ment boom is temporary,  the deficits  will give way over time and vr will 
rise. Hence, a deficit  will be followed by a real depreciation.  The real 
depreciation  may appear  to have "caused"  the restoration  of current  ac- 
count  balance.  In fact, e and CA are  responding  jointly  to a more  funda- 
mental  shock. 
Note that  the correlation  between  7r  and CA can be of either  sign. The 
following  results are easy to establish  in a two-good, two-period,  two- 
country  model:  (1) a temporary  boom today (increase  in 41)  raises  7r and 
CA; (2) a temporary  increase  in export  demand  (increase  in Yl*)  lowers  7r 
and raises  CA;  and  (3) a permanent  increase  in export  demand  (increase  in 
Y1*,  Y*) lowers 7r and may reduce CA. Many other examples  are also 
possible. 
Finally,  there  is the exchange-risk  or interest-differential  mechanism. 
Portfolio  models  such  as in those  of Dornbusch  and  Kouri  and  de Macedo 
typically  take c  to be a function  of the net wealth  of home and foreign Jefirey  D. Sachs  257 
residents  and the outstanding  stocks of assets in various currency  de- 
nominations.48  Because these determinants  of  p change slowly, the  p 
is expected  to move very gradually  over time.49  Many researchers  have 
attempted  without  success  to isolate  a stable  value of  p for various  major 
currencies,  although  the hypothesis  p =  0 has been repeatedly  rejected. 
In my view, the determination  of p has been modeled  too restrictively 
by focusing  on risk  but  not on the role  of extensive  capital-flow  regulations 
in many  countries.  As Dooley and  Isard  recently  showed  for Germany  in 
the 1970-74 period,  capital  controls  can account  for significant  interest 
rate differentials  between  home and foreign  assets even apart  from risk 
considerations.50  Regulations  impose  implicit  and explicit  costs of inter- 
mediation  between  national  financial  markets.  Lenders  in one country 
can be encouraged  to lend to foreign  firms  only if the foreign-domestic 
interest  rate differential  is high enough to surmount  official  barriers  to 
capital  outflows. 
Capital  controls  may result  in an arbitrage  schedule  linking p to the 
current  account.  As foreign  borrowing  rises (CA falls), the marginal  cost 
of funds rises. As  p grows,  home interest  rates rise above it,  and e de- 
preciates according  to  14. Suppose, for example, that restrictions  on 
incremental  borrowing  imply that the current  account  must be greater 
than CA. A rise in home investment  demand  may then result  in an in- 
crease  in home interest  rates  above  the world  interest  rate-that  is, a rise 
in p-and  a deficit  at the maximum  permitted  level. The deficit  will be 
associated  with an exchange  rate depreciation.  In this view,  p may be 
quite  volatile  because  it does not result  from  slowly  changing  risk  factors. 
EVIDENCE  ON  EXCHANGE  RATES 
AND  THE  CURRENT  ACCOUNT 
Despite the voluminous  literature  analyzing  the links of e and CA, 
there  has been very little systematic  description  of the historical  relation 
between  these  variables  for OECD  economies.  Table 15 summarizes  that 
48.  Dornbusch, "Exchange Rate Economics," and Kouri and de Macedo, "Ex- 
change  Rates and the International  Adjustment  Process." 
49. It might be argued that while asset stocks move slowly, market estimates of 
the covariances  that underlie the stock demand functions change rapidly. 
50. See Michael P. Dooley, and Peter Isard, "Capital Controls, Political Risks 
and Deviations from Interest-Rate  Parity," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 88 
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experience. The table should dispel any simple notions  about linkages 
between e and CA, though some important patterns are discernible. Over- 
all many deficit countries experienced nominal and real exchange rate 
appreciation, while countries with surpluses (including the United States 
and Japan)  showed nominal and real exchange rate depreciations. The 
smaller countries-Austria,  Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Norway- 
show significant current account deficits and real exchange rate apprecia- 
tion during the period. The real exchange rate is defined in terms of the 
wholesale price index, and these conclusions might vary with a different 
price measure. 
In table 15 I also examine whether countries with deficits in fact ex- 
perience real depreciations, and countries with surpluses, real apprecia- 
tions.  For  this purpose,  a  country is  said  to  be  in  "deficit" when  its 
CA/GNP  ratio is less than the average CA/GNP  ratio for the entire group 
of countries, denoted as (CA/GNP)?  in the table.5' For the seven large 
countries with seven annual observations each, the hypothesis fares well. 
Of the forty-nine annual observations for the large countries, almost 70 
percent show deficit years associated with depreciation or surplus years 
with appreciation. In a x2 test of independence of CA/GNP  and the per- 
centage change in (eP*/P),  independence can be rejected at p =  0.05. 
The story is quite different for the smaller countries, where 50 percent of 
the observations reject the basic hypothesis. The smaller countries appear 
to be on long-run growth paths that are characterized by real exchange 
rate appreciation and current account deficits. Perhaps the appropriate 
test for these countries is whether deficits greater than "normal" are asso- 
ciated with smaller-than-normal real exchange rate appreciations. I have 
not yet examined this question. 
For most  countries, including the United  States, a positive  relation 
exists between the level of ln(eP*/P)  and [CA/GNP  -  (CA/GNP)?] 
(with both measured as deviations from linear trend). In annual data for 
1960-79,  ln(eP*/P)  and [CA/GNP  -  (CA/GNP)?]  are positively cor- 
related for ten of thirteen countries. This is as expected when shifts in the 
current account originate from shocks to home demand: periods of high 
demand are characterized by low eP*/P  and CA/GNP;  the reverse is true 
for periods of low demand. 
51. Because the real exchange rate is a relative price that prevails between coun- 
tries, relative prices must be compared with relative current account positions and 
not merely the current  account position of a particular  country. Jeffrey  D. Sachs  261 
Figure 4 helps to put in perspective the U.S. real exchange rate depre- 
ciation in 1977-78.  It compares the U.S. GDP deflator in manufacturing 
relative to  an average of  deflators of  other countries with the ratio of 
CA  to  GNP  for  the United  States. The  correlation of  CA/GNP  and 
ln(eP*/P),  with both as deviations from linear trend, is 0.50  over the 
1961-79  period. There is a marked trend depreciation in 1960-80  in the 
U.S. real exchange rate, measured by the relative deflators, which is punc- 
tuated by an episode of real appreciation in 1975-76,  measured by im- 
provements relative to trend in the relative deflator. In this case, significant 
deficits followed  appreciation. A  nominal  exchange  rate depreciation 
(not shown)  restored P/eP*  to its downward trend. The deficit can be 
traced to a temporary spending boom during the U.S. cyclical recovery in 
1976-78  when investment in Europe and Japan remained depressed. The 
large nominal depreciation in 1978 again reduced the real exchange rate 
relative to its historical trend. In this view,  the deficits on  the current 
account in  1977  and 1978  are not the primary cause of the dollar de- 
preciation. Rather, the deficits are associated with  a previous real ex- 
change rate appreciation caused by a temporary investment boom. As the 
investment boom  ended,  a nominal  depreciation brought the  real ex- 
change rate below its downward trend. Econometric evidence in support 
of the view that nominal exchange rates have moved to accomplish real 
exchange movements may be found in the study by Hooper and Morton.52 
Other theories of the exchange rate do not explain these developments 
well. Purely monetary explanations founder on two points: they do not 
explain the persistent real exchange rate movements for the two years 
after 1977, and they miss the more basic point that the U.S. money supply 
was growing less rapidly, and accelerated less, than that of Germany or 
Japan.53  The wealth effects of the U.S.  deficit are too  small to explain 
much. The  $16  billion  deficit in  1977  was  approximately 0.3  percent 
of national wealth, too  small to explain the large drop in the effective 
52. Hooper and Morton,  "Fluctuations  in the Dollar." 
53.  Consider the annual growth rates of Ml  from 1976 to 1979 for the United 
States, Germany, and Japan; taken from McKinnon: United States-5.7,  8.8, 7.3, 
6.1; Germany-3.9,  11.9, 14.5, 3.6; and Japan-12.5,  8.2,  13.4, 3.0. See Ronald 
McKinnon, "Currency  Substitution  and Instability in the World Dollar Standard," 
Memorandum  242 (Center for Research in Economic Growth, Stanford  University, 
August 1980); and Jeffrey A. Frankel, "The Mystery of the Multiplying Marks: A 
Modification  of  the Monetary Model" (Department of  Economics, University of 
California,  Berkeley, August 1980). Figure 4.  The U.S.  Relative GDP  Deflator for Manufacturing and the Ratio of the 
Current Account to GNP,  1961:1-1979:4 
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,  Main Economic Indicators, various issues; 
GNP-International  Monetary Fund, Interniational  Finiancial  Statistics, various issues. 
a.  The relative U.S.  GDP  deflator for manufacturing, P/eP*,  is an index reflecting the ratio of that 
deflator to a weighted geometric average of the same deflator for thirteen other industrial countries, after 
expression of all the national indicators in terms of a common currency. The trend is calculated by re- 
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exchange rate by the mechanism suggested by Dornbusch and Fischer. 
Moreover, wealth in the United States in toto was probably growing more 
rapidly relative to trend than in Germany or Japan, given the slowdown 
in capital accumulation in those countries. Finally, Frankel has recently 
shown the inadequacy of the portfolio view in interpreting the deprecia- 
tion. Among other things, the stock of deutsche mark-denominated gov- 
ernment debt, expanded more rapidly than the stock of dollar-denomi- 
nated debt over the period under consideration.54 
This discussion should not imply that either real factors or monetary 
factors typically account for exchange rate movements; indeed, the re- 
verse is true. The correlation between e and other variables of interest 
will not be stable across subperiods because such correlations merely re- 
flect the predominance of some source of disturbance in the period being 
considered. Attempts to explain exchange rate "news" as a function of 
other sources of  news, can be misleading. Although news matters, un- 
anticipated changes in CA, GNP, i, or other economic variables can come 
from a variety of real or monetary shocks, each of which implies a dis- 
tinct type of exchange rate adjustment. 
Conclusions 
This paper takes a step toward integrating analysis of the current ac- 
count with modern theories of saving and investment. While the absorp- 
tion and elasticities approaches to the current account have long ago been 
integrated, the current account is still often analyzed in a partial equi- 
librium framework by focusing on import and export demand relations. 
Moreover, economic and political thinking is still caught up in the mer- 
cantilist idea that deficits reflect overspending and therefore require ad- 
justment. In fact, the current account flows in the 1970s reflect an inter- 
action between OPEC saving and shifting worldwide investment patterns. 
These are cases of rising deficits caused by declining saving for particular 
LDCs that faced sharp terms-of-trade losses on important export items. 
However, most of the recent LDC borrowing was accounted for by the 
LDCs with large saving and investment flows-those  that are enjoying 
54. See Frankel, "The Mystery of the Multiplying  Marks,"  p. 8. 264  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
the  fruits of  promising investment  opportunities without  the  need  to 
squeeze current consumption. 
Economic policymakers have worried that deficits imply a depreciation 
of the exchange rate, with inflationary consequences. As  shown above, 
such a simple linkage is only one theoretical possibility and does not pre- 
dominate in cross-country data. The link is often severed when capital 
controls are absent, so that foreign borrowing can proceed at the world 
interest rate. 
The  empirical evidence in this paper is clearly rudimentary, though 
suggestive,  on  a  number of  key  points.  Further econometric  work  is 
needed to derive useful equations for the current account that distinguish 
between responses to transitory and permanent shocks. A great deal of 
work remains to be done in explaining the terms of international borrow- 
ing, particularly the spreads and maturities on Euromarket loans to the 
LDCs. One of the crucial issues of international economic policy in this 
regard involves the continued willingness of international banks to  re- 
finance and expand Brazil's enormous debt. Also, there should be a focus 
on the determinants of world interest rates and how they affect world 
income  distributions-for  example,  among OPEC,  nonoil  LDCs,  and 
OECD  countries-and  the profitability of  investment in various major 
regions. 
APPENDIX 
Accounting  for Capital  Gains  and Losses 
on International  Investments 
THE high inflation and high indebtedness of the nonoil LDCs in the late 
1970s has contributed to a major overstatement of LDC current account 
deficits. The national accounts record the nominal interest charges on 
this debt as a service account debit but do not record the inflation-induced 
erosion in real value of the debt as an offsetting credit. Stated differently, 
the accounts record the nominal, not real, interest charges as outflows of 
the service account. With high inflation, nominal interest charges can be 
several hundred percent, or of the opposite sign, of real interest costs. Jefirey  D. Sachs  265 
If B* is the amount of foreign-currency denominated debt, then 
Pt  A  Pt+l 
is the value of capital gains earned on the foreign debt, expressed in units 
of the foreign good. Total interest costs are given as 
i*B*_  B*  /1-t  ,  or  B*  -  _______  11t  J  or  I 
P*  *  P* 
Pt  P* 
but only i*B*/P*  is officially recorded. To make the appropriate adjust- 
ments from measured to total interest costs, it is necessary to know the 
value of outstanding interest bearing assets, their currencies of denomina- 
tion, and the rates of inflation of those currencies. 
The first two variables are not easily determined. It is very difficult to 
measure the outstanding net foreign investment position, and even more 
so to diifferentiate  between interest-bearing and equity positions. More- 
over, short-term credits (maturing in less than one year)  are notoriously 
underreported, and there are no estimates of short-term foreign invest- 
ment positions for the LDCs or the OECD countries as a whole. Currency 
of denomination is almost never reported except in specific markets (such 
as the Eurodollar market or foreign exchange reserves),  and the effective 
currency of denomination can easily be altered for a given debt by taking 
a net position in a forward currency market. 
To make the approximate calculations shown in text, I assume that 
all  interest-bearing  debt  and  foreign  exchange  reserves  are  dollar- 
denominated, ignore all short-term credits, and assume that OPEC's net 
investment position in 1967,  aside from foreign exchange reserves, was 
zero. Then, the debt of the nonoil LDCs to the OECD and to OPEC is 
taken from OECD, Development Co-Operation, statistical annex, "Total 
Debt of Developing Countries (Disbursed)  At Year End, and Total An- 
nual Debt Service For Selected Groups of Developing Countries," various 
issues. Net foreign exchange positions for OPEC and the oil-importing 
LDCs are from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics. OPEC total claims are calculated by cumulating OPEC current 
account surpluses from 1967  and subtracting direct foreign investment 
outflows. OPEC claims on the OECD  countries are then calculated as 
total OPEC claims, minus foreign exchange accumulation since  1967, 
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Table A-1  results from making these calculations. To  determine the 
capital gains and losses, the U.S. inflation rate is multiplied by the net 
position (an average of two periods).  Inflation is given as the growth of 
the U.S. GNP deflator from the fourth quarter of one year to that of the 
next. 
In table A-2 the same calculations are made for four OECD economies, 
including the United States. Note that the United States is a net debtor in 
nominal  assets because  of  the large stock  of  official foreign exchange 
liabilities of the U.S. Treasury, and thus makes capital gains each year, 
which raise the current account. The corrections for Germany are cer- 
tainly too large because much of the German assets are mark-denomi- 
nated; Germany experienced smaller capital losses than countries holding 
entirely dollar-denominated  assets.  The  data  for  table  A-2  are from 
sources on the individual countries: for the United Kingdom, "An Inven- 
tory of U.K. External Assets and Liabilities: end-1978," Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin, vol.  19  (June  1979),  pp.  160-63;  for Japan, The 
National Income Accounts  of Japan, 1979,  pp. 494-95;  for Germany, 
"Assets  and  Liabilities  of  Banking  Groups," Monthly  Report  of  the 
Deutsches Bundesbank, vol.  31  (September 1979),  pp. 28-34;  and for 
the United States, Russell B. Scholl, "The International Investment Posi- 
tion of  the United States: Developments  in  1979,"  Survey of  Current 
Business, vol. 60 (August 1980),  pp. 52-56  and preceding issues. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Richard N.  Cooper:  Jeffrey Sachs is  surely right on  his  fundamental 
proposition: current  account imbalances should be allocated among coun- 
tries  according to  their national  investment  opportunities  relative  to 
availability of national savings, and there is no reason to suppose these 
(net)  opportunities are correlated with oil imports or indeed with any 
other single component of international transactions. 
In the context of overall saving-investment analysis, countries should 
not  take  any particular view  of  their current account  position  at  all. 
Some will draw savings from the rest of the world, others will invest in 
the rest of the world. Nothing is wrong with this; it is as it should be. 
But  suppose,  wrongly, that countries do  have  balance-of-payments 
targets; or, less formally, that they have strong expectations about their 
payments position based on past results augmented or rationalized by 
some theoretical reasoning. Then suppose oil prices are raised by  300 
percent, and oil is an important item in a country's balance of payments. 
Should that country retain its previous target (expectations),  or should 
it revise them? And if the latter, how? On what principles? 
These were the questions that some analysts and officials addressed in 
1974. Their concern was that nations, in an attempt to restore their pay- 
ments positions before the price increase, would engage in a fruitless and 
indeed mutually damaging scramble to improve those positions through 
deflation, import restrictions, or both. To prevent this possibility, some 
"burden-sharing"  formula was needed. During the impact period, a rule 
of thumb as good as any seemed to be: each nation should adjust its ex- 
pectations about its current account by the increase of its oil payments. 
This would only be the impact effect, and various adjustment processes 
could (and were assumed to)  begin to work-directly  in the oil market, 
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as well as through the adjustment of expenditures to lowered real income. 
Thus these impact effects would gradually give way to a much more com- 
plex pattern of deficits in the oil-importing countries. But a key general 
point remained: so long as the OPEC surpluses persisted, other countries 
-taken  together-had  to have current account deficits, and this was an 
ineluctable fact to which the summation of targets and expectations in 
oil-importing countries had to accommodate. 
The country-by-country pattern of these medium-term deficits can be 
expected to be very complex. But contrary to some views expressed in the 
1970s,  there is no reason to expect that all deficits (net foreign invest- 
ments)  should be in developing countries, in other words, that industrial 
nations should eliminate their deficits. On the contrary, with new relative 
prices some of the best investment opportunities, from a global perspec- 
tive, are likely to be in the industrial countries. With large savings now 
accumulating in the OPEC countries, countries that in the past have been 
net investors abroad might now quite properly have deficits, or, in other 
words, be net capital importers. To the extent that capital is readily sub- 
stitutable for energy, a sharp rise in the price of  energy should, ceteris 
paribus, lead  to  factor-substituting (as  opposed  to  output-increasing) 
investment-to  a movement along isoquants rather than to new, higher 
isoquants.  Although  this  phenomenon  should  take  place  everywhere 
around the world, the size of the capital stock in the industrial countries 
that is rendered totally or partially obsolete  suggests that, at least for a 
number of  years, calls  by  these  countries on  new  savings of  the  oil- 
exporting countries might be substantial, and might lead to current ac- 
count  deficits by  the industrial countries during the  period  of  factor- 
substituting investment. 
Sachs' analysis and empirical results put heavy weight on swings in 
national investment as the principal determinant of current account posi- 
tions because he finds that savings rates in practice are relatively stable. 
But what explains the variations in investment? In the context considered 
by Sachs, I suggest the following four factors may help to explain move- 
ments  in  national  investment  relative  to  national  saving,  and  hence 
changes in current account positions. 
1.  The major rise in savings in OPEC countries led to an increase in 
world savings, which in turn lowered the real interest rate. The response 
of investment to lower real interest rates will presumably vary from coun- Jefirey  D. Sachs  271 
try to country, hence so will the change in current account arising from 
this factor. 
2.  A  sharp increase in energy prices will raise sharply the marginal 
return to  energy-reducing investment at prices and demand levels  that 
permit full utilization. The magnitude of  the resulting induced invest- 
ment will presumably bear a strong positive relation to the size of each 
national capital stock because the complementary factors-mainly  skilled 
labor and appropriate social structure-remain.  Factor-substituting in- 
vestment will occur as discussed above. 
3.  Movements  in  prices  of  complementary  factors,  especially  real 
wages, may preclude profitable production at the previous levels. Firms 
find themselves noncompetitive.  This effect will  vary from country to 
country with the rigidity of real wages and, over a slightly longer period, 
with the substitutability of capital for labor. 
4.  Aggregate demand management will  strongly affect the expecta- 
tions of investors about their ability to sell their output in the future. The 
prospect of a considerable period of economic slack tolerated or induced 
by the authorities to fight inflation or payments deficits will be more dis- 
couraging to investors than the prospect of steady growth in real aggre- 
gate demand. Again, countries have varied considerably in this regard, 
with  the  major industrial  countries  generally  pulling  in  the  reins  of 
aggregate demand in 1974, while many smaller industrial countries and 
developing countries tried to stay on their pre-1974  growth paths, bor- 
rowing abroad as necessary to finance the resulting imbalances in pay- 
ments. 
In this paper Sachs puts some weight on the first of these factors in 
determining national investment; in a previous paper in BPEA,  2:1979 
he stressed the third factor.' All undoubtedly play some role, but I place 
greater emphasis on the second and especially the fourth factors as de- 
terminants  of national investment, and hence (given the apparent stability 
of savings rates)  swings in current account positions during the period 
under discussion. 
In the final section of  his paper, in which he discusses the link be- 
tween exchange rates and current account imbalances, Sachs properly re- 
1. Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Wages, Profits, and Macroeconomic Adjustment." 272  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1981 
minds us that many things influence the exchange rate and its covariance 
with the current account. That has long been recognized, but it is useful 
to be reminded of it from time to time, especially the role of exogenous 
disturbances. Sachs boldly  sums up many of  the influences on  the ex- 
change rate in his equation 14. 
The task of an empirical science, however, is not so much to describe 
what can happen as what has happened, and why. I find Sachs' explana- 
tion of the  1970s  deficient in this regard. I suggest two direct linkages 
between the exchange rate and the current account. One is the so-called 
J curve: if prices change faster than quantities adjust, the current account 
will be influenced contemporaneously and positively.  (Appreciation im- 
proves, depreciation "weakens" the current account, using conventional 
terminology.)  This factor offers an alternative interpretation of  Sachs' 
empirical observation of a positive correlation between movements in the 
exchange rate and the current account. 
Over time quantity adjustment should become more important and the 
upward swing of the J occurs. Sachs implies, correctly, that the process 
has to be linked to saving-investment behavior. 
Another,  more controversial, linkage is that the current account in- 
fluences, with a lag, the exchange rate. This influence has two possible 
channels that are mutually supporting. The first is simply the problem of 
financing a current deficit under flexible exchange rates. If there is not 
enough autonomous capital inflow, interest rates or exchange rates must 
adjust to induce the capital inflow required to finance the deficit. 
The  second  channel  concerns  the  formation  of  expectations  about 
future exchange rates. All  analysts must summarize information to sim- 
plify  a  complex  reality. Economists  often  make  this  simplification by 
looking at two-stage least-square estimators of coefficients in simultane- 
ous  equation  systems.  Others look  at last  week's  money  supply.  Still 
others look at the patterns of averages in the stock market. 
In assessing whether a country's external accounts are doing well or 
badly, most observers look at the balance of payments. This concept has 
undergone various transformations, but with the advent of flexible ex- 
change rates no single concept makes good sense, and official statistics 
now proliferate. The current account-or,  more correctly, the balance on 
goods and services-is  the most comprehensible concept remaining, and 
people watch it. In industrial countries it appears with a lag of perhaps 
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are known earlier. My guess is that this simple, comprehensible statistic 
influences sentiment about the exchange market-whether  things are per- 
ceived to be going well or badly-and  that in turn influences exchange 
rates. If  one  looks  at nominal exchange rates of  the major industrial 
countries since 1973,  most movements can be explained by differential 
inflation rates. But the remaining changes in  real  exchange rates, cor- 
rected for inflation differentials, track relative current account changes 
quite well, with a modest lag. There are exceptions, however, as Sachs' 
analysis suggests there should be. 
One final, brief point is that Sachs correctly reminds us that in  an 
inflationary environment the interest component reckoned into current 
account payments conceals  a capital transaction, because  the inflation 
premium on interest rates is designed to preserve the real value of  the 
capital investment. He shows that this factor is quantitatively important 
both in the deficits of less-developed  countries and in OPEC surpluses, 
and it raises both by $10 billion to $14 billion a year. This correction to 
current account deficits is small comfort to the less-developed countries, 
however, since the inflation-corrected figures imply a faster amortization 
of capital than is apparent, as the effective maturity of  the loans is re- 
duced. Total debt-servicing requirements-interest  plus amortization- 
thus remain much higher than Sachs' corrections seem to imply. 
Stanley Fischer:  Sachs has written a stimulating and ambitious paper that 
attempts to  create intellectual  order from  the  confusion  of  the  inter- 
national economy of the 1970s. The paper accomplishes two main objec- 
tives. First, it provides a useful framework for analysis of the longer-term 
balance of payments and the exchange rate. Second, it makes the empiri- 
cal judgment that the prime force determining movements in non-OPEC 
current accounts and the exchange rate in the  1970s was a shift in the 
pattern of  international investment.  I  take up  four  points:  what  was 
thought before, the theoretical apparatus, the evidence on the investment 
and current  account hypothesis, and the current account and the exchange 
rate. 
If  a  random macroeconomist  had  been  asked,  before  reading this 
paper, whether oil was a factor that influenced the current account in the 
1970s, he would almost certainly have said yes. He would have been cor- 
rect. After all, the OPEC surpluses are hard to  explain without oil.  If 
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OECD he would have thought for a moment and mentioned Germany 
and Japan. Indeed,  this is what Paul Volcker  did in  the  speech from 
which Sachs quotes:  "So long  as those  [OPEC] surpluses exist,  other 
countries, taken together, will have a deficit. But oil cannot fully explain 
the extent of the current imbalances or how they are distributed. A hand- 
ful of oil-importing countries, led by Japan, also have large and persistent 
surpluses. The deficits of others far exceed the impact of oil prices on 
their imports."' 
But what would the macroeconomist make of the current account per- 
formance of Japan and Germany?  Probably the following: that the impact 
effect of an oil price increase is likely to worsen a country's balance of 
payments the more oil is imported. Then countries have to adjust, and 
some of them adjust better than others. Over a period longer than a year, 
there need not be any association between the size of oil imports and the 
current account  for  an individual  country-though,  given  the  OPEC 
surplus, such a relation holds for non-OPEC countries taken together. 
Methods  of  adjustment would  include  restrictive monetary and  fiscal 
policy to reduce aggregate demand and probably measures to decrease 
the demand for imported oil-for  example, allowing the domestic price 
of oil to rise to the world level. 
Policies  that concentrate on the demand for oil  are inspired by the 
identity that the current account is equal to exports plus the service ac- 
count minus imports. There is also the absorption identity, and it is neces- 
sary to show why a policy that reduces oil imports affects the difference 
between income and absorption. There is no infallible link. The higher 
price of oil might reduce the rate of return to capital and reduce invest- 
ment demand. But it is quite possible that, as McKinnon and Sachs point 
out, policies directed to energy will have no effect on the current account. 
This is an important point that bears frequent repeating. Countries try to 
cut their oil imports not only for current account adjustment, but also to 
reduce their vulnerability to a cutoff of oil imports. 
It does appear that more sophisticated views than the above were ex- 
pressed, however. For instance, the International Monetary Fund's World 
Economic  Outlook  (May  1980)  presents a careful analysis of  the oil 
problem that contains some  of  the  elements  emphasized by  Sachs. It 
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argues that in a flexible-price, full-employment world an increase in the 
price of oil and consequent OPEC surpluses would initially 
...  cut real consumption  and/or saving  because  of falling  real income, and ... 
raise investment  because of the effect of the inflow of funds from the oil ex- 
porting  countries  on the interest  rate. The level of real domestic  demand  and 
economic activity  would remain  unaffected  as domestic agents consumed  and 
saved  less and domestic  investment  rose...  . In the longer  run, a process  of real 
transfer  of resources  from the industrial  countries  to the oil exporting  coun- 
tries would  develop.  .  . . Part of the real transfer could,  however,  come  from 
the increase  in output  resulting  from the additional  investment.  This basic ad- 
justment  through  investment  and saving is built on three important  assump- 
tions: (i)  nominal  wages and prices are flexible, (ii)  the investment  schedule 
is elastic, and (iii)  real wages can fall. However, none of these assumptions 
seems to be valid.2 
The theoretical emphasis in Sachs' paper is on intertemporal maximi- 
zation and the distinction between permanent and transitory disturbances. 
Of the three forms of the current account identity-exports  minus im- 
ports, income minus absorption, and saving minus investment-Sachs' 
preference is for the third. Now identities have the property of being true 
if the data are measured correctly, so that any form is ultimately as good 
as any other. The reason for using one rather than another is that it shifts 
the emphasis in a particular way. For  that reason, the exports-minus- 
imports form of the current account is least useful. Sachs' preference for 
saving minus investment results from his analysis of the current account 
as the result of intertemporal decisions. His choice is suitable for a longer- 
run analysis in which full employment is assumed. Otherwise, it might be 
better to work with the income-minus-absorption form, which makes the 
analyst more conscious of income movements as potential equilibrating 
mechanisms. No  user of  the  absorption form  should  forget that con- 
sumption and investment functions are usually derived by intertemporal 
optimization. 
Sachs' basic model of the current account-and  this is only the tip of 
his theoretical iceberg-is  neat. Nonetheless,  this particular form of the 
model is special. Investment is determined solely by the world interest 
rate, which is given. Therefore none of the domestic variables like fiscal 
policy or current output affect investment. Given current income, a per- 
2. International  Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (IMF, May 1980), 
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manent change in government spending entirely crowds out consump- 
tion. A  transitory increase in government spending produces a current 
account deficit, regardless of how it is financed, since consumers inter- 
nalize the government budget constraint. 
The main exercise for which the model is used is to analyze the effects 
on the current account and the exchange rate of an increase in the price 
of oil. A permanent increase in the price of oil should make individuals 
realize that their permanent income is reduced so that income and con- 
sumption change by about the same amount, at the given world interest 
rate. A transitory increase in the price of oil reduces current income by 
more  than consumption,  so  that  the  current account  worsens.  These 
answers seem about right over a period of  a few years. The short-run 
(one-year)  effect  of  an  oil  price  increase  on  an  importing  country, 
though, is probably to create a deficit in the current account even if the 
price increase is permanent. This is because there is likely to be a period 
of  reduced production as the economy  adapts to  the changed relative 
price of  oil,  possibly with transitional unemployment. In  addition, the 
inelasticity of oil demand in the short run will likely increase spending or 
reduce saving. 
The other important exercise for which the model is used deals with 
the effects of an increase in investment on the current account. At a fixed 
interest rate an increase in investment worsens the current account. Be- 
cause the increased investment is  treated as a rise in the  demand for 
domestic goods, the relative price of domestic goods rises, appreciating 
the real exchange rate. Thus a current account deficit caused by an invest- 
ment boom will be accompanied by an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate rather than a depreciation. 
Sachs indicates briefly how  to extend the model  to make the world 
interest  rate  endogenous  and  then  how  to  permit  inflation-adjusted 
national interest rates to  diverge from each  other when capital move- 
ments are controlled. He remarks that movements in the world interest 
rate play an important role in equilibrating the balance of payments and 
undertakes some Mishkin-style regressions to show that ex post real rates 
have fallen in the non-OPEC world in the 1970s. 
I have three comments here. First, one  reason the real interest rate 
plays an important equilibrating  role in the model is that income does not. 
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interest rates are ex ante rates. No  doubt these, too,  fell in the  1970s, 
though the 1977  and 1978 U.S. real rates were at least positive, if one 
ignores taxes. The third comment is that the Sachs model deemphasizes 
the role of  macroeconomic  policy  in  affecting the  current account  or 
indeed the economy. Once the interest rate is free to move, or if income 
becomes a variable, changes in G can once more have effects on the cur- 
rent account, and certainly government policy can affect national rates of 
investment. The current version of the model is useful for showing how 
a system with passive policy would adjust, but adjustment can and has 
also been helped or hindered by the government. 
The most striking feature in the paper is the empirical claim that in the 
1970s current account developments outside OPEC were dominated by 
investment shifts among countries. As Sachs is careful to emphasize, this 
need not have happened. National saving rates could have adjusted and 
investment rates could have remained stable, but instead, he argues, it 
went the other way. The shifts in investment are explained as resulting 
largely from changes in expected rates of return around the world, with 
the OECD  countries experiencing the end of  their post-World War II 
investment boom and the NICs taking off. 
At a broad level, Sachs is surely right to emphasize the role of increased 
investment in the NICs and changes in investment in OECD countries as 
one of the major factors explaining the size and distribution of current 
account positions in the world economy after the oil shock. But the em- 
phasis is surely exaggerated. Sachs disposes of two alternative hypotheses. 
The first is that saving caused current account shifts. The main evidence 
of this is provided by table 14, in which the change in fixed investment 
earns a higher ]R2 in "explaining" current account changes than does the 
change in saving. 
However, table 14 is difficult to interpret. If inventory investment were 
added back to investment, a regression of the change in the current ac- 
count on the change in saving and the change in investment would be an 
identity, with an J2  of unity, coefficients of plus and minus one, respec- 
tively, and gratifying t-statistics. It is  unclear how  the correlation be- 
tween each of the components of the definition of the current account and 
the current account itself helps in identifying the cause of  current ac- 
count changes. For instance, the data in table 9  (which were not those 
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"explains"  the current account. Should one conclude that current account 
changes after the oil shock are mainly a reflection of changed inventory 
accumulation? 
Given the current account definition, it makes sense to ask whether 
saving also matters by looking at the underlying data, in tables 8 and 9, 
to see how much saving and fixed investment each changed before and 
after 1973. It turns out that saving fluctuates more than investment when 
each is measured as a percentage of GNP. For instance, in table 8 the 
mean absolute change in the investment percentage for the NICs between 
1965-73  and 1974-79  is 2.9 percentage points; for saving the mean ab- 
solute change is 3.2 percentage points. Similarly, in table 9 for the OECD 
countries, the mean absolute change in investment as  a percentage of 
GNP is 2.0 percentage points, versus 2.7 points for saving. Saving does 
not appear to be a passive component of the current account. 
A similar impression is given by examination of individual countries. 
In Brazil saving fell  as a percentage of GNP by 2.2  percentage points 
between the two periods, while investment rose 0.8 point; the current ac- 
count deficit increased by 1.9 points. In Mexico investment increased as 
a percentage of GNP by 3.1 percentage points while saving rose by 3.9 
points, with the current account deficit increasing by 0.9 point, and so on. 
I am not arguing that saving is the entire story or that Sachs has not 
performed a useful service in drawing attention to the role of investment. 
But it is clear that there were large movements in both saving and invest- 
ment after 1973,  and that an approach that emphasizes the current ac- 
count  as the  difference between  saving and investment should  devote 
equal attention to each in analyzing changes in current account positions 
in the 1970s. 
The second hypothesis is that cyclical movements in output have some- 
thing to do with average current account performance during the 1970s. 
This is a difficult view to disentangle from the investment hypothesis be- 
cause investment and the cycle are closely correlated. The evidence for 
the OECD countries, shown in table 7, weakly supports the investment 
hypothesis. But the weakness of the evidence is confirmed by the results 
of table 14: when 1974 and 1975 are omitted, investment does not sig- 
nificantly enter the current account equation for nonoil countries. Thus 
one awaits further research to confirm the relative roles of investment and 
the cycle in the time-series context. Sachs emphasizes that independent 
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investment, but this view assumes the movements in output are supply- 
and not demand-determined. 
All  the regressions in this section suffer from the problem of  endo- 
geneity of  the variables on the right-hand side. As  Sachs notes,  much 
more work is needed to establish the causal relation for which he is argu- 
ing. Indeed, it is  not even  clear whether he believes  that the shifts in 
investment were caused by animal spirits or rather reflect shifts in rates 
of return on investment following changes in the prices of raw materials. 
Sachs addresses the debt problem of the less-developed countries and 
argues strongly, as do others, for the real bills doctrine. He doubts that 
there is much danger of debt default because the debt has largely gone to 
countries that have invested. However,  those  are not by and large the 
countries about whom the world is worrying. Further, as critics of the real 
bills doctrine point out, what is a productive loan depends on the state of 
the business cycle. Loans that appear productive now will not seem pro- 
ductive if a cumulative process of debt default should get under way. So 
long as the possibility of  a cumulative process is well recognized, it is 
likely to be avoided. 
The part of the paper on exchange rates and the current account pulls 
together a variety of  theories of  the  current account  and  argues per- 
suasively that many movements in exchange rates are changes in real 
rates. The reminder that correlations between endogenous variables de- 
pend on the source of disturbances is a valuable general lesson,  which 
will be taken to heart by all users of the Phillips curve, the Fisher equa- 
tion, and so forth. 
The explanation of the behavior of the dollar exchange rate and the 
U.S. current account during the last recovery is equally consistent with 
the view that trade flows react with a lag to changes in exchange rates, 
and that relative output levels affect the demand for imports. 
The most striking argument of this paper is that shifts in investment 
account for the pattern of current account movements observed outside 
OPEC countries during the last decade-and  that those shifts have rela- 
tively little to do with oil. As  Sachs concludes at the end of his paper, 
it is certainly now a hypothesis that bears further investigation. At  the 
same time, this hypothesis would at best characterize an empirical regu- 
larity and not an iron law of economics. 
Indeed, it is a pity that a paper as interesting as this one conveys the 
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explaining. It really is not too difficult to look  at more than one cause. 
If we feel the need for simple explanations of  current accounts in the 
1970s, we can use a two-factor model: the factors are oil and nonindus- 
trial countries. 
General Discussion 
Rudiger Dornbusch agreed with the emphasis Sachs had placed on the 
relation between saving and investment in understanding the current ac- 
count and real exchange rate. However, he felt that Sachs had exaggerated 
the importance of investment. He suggested that the author adopt a more 
balanced view in which shifts in saving and investment are complemen- 
tary rather than competitive explanations of the current account. Dorn- 
busch argued that, while the recent experience of countries such as Nor- 
way is explained by shifts in investment, in other countries changes in 
saving are more  important. For  example,  the  recent improvement in 
Pakistan's current account can be attributed to the increased saving from 
remittances of emigrant workers in the Persian Gulf states. Dornbusch 
also presented data showing that changes in saving rates in Brazil are 
more important than movements in investment in explaining the current 
account during the 1970s. 
Robert  Lawrence questioned the  significance of  investment for  the 
United  States. He  noted that the time-series regression for the United 
States shows little evidence of a consistent relation between the rate of 
investment and the current account. Furthermore, Sachs' argument that 
the appreciation of the dollar in 1975 was due to an increased rate of U.S. 
investment is wrong in its timing. In fact, investment declined sharply in 
1975. Similarly, the dollar declined in 1977 and 1978 when the U.S. rate 
of investment was relatively higher. 
George Perry argued that Sachs' theoretical model paid insufficient 
attention to  cyclical  departures from trend. Whatever its relative con- 
stancy along the trend, the total saving rate is systematically correlated 
with departures from that trend, in part because government deficits rise 
with the GNP gap. This breaks the simple relation between investment 
and the current account. Empirically, the causal importance of different 
cyclical influences on the current account are hard to sort out. For ex- 
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depends on whether changes in saving are endogenous cyclical variations 
or exogenous shifts. The coefficients in Sachs' equations reflect a mixture 
of the two effects. The performance of GNP gap in his equations may be 
dominated by the fact that large gaps were associated with the exogenous 
deterioration of the current account resulting from the OPEC oil price 
increases. Although Perry agreed with the importance of distinguishing 
between permanent and transitory shocks at a theoretical level, he ob- 
served that empirically they are difficult  to distinguish. Neither economists 
nor economic agents can be confident about the permanence of an event, 
whether it is a cyclical downturn, a productivity shock, or an increase in 
oil price. 
Lawrence reasoned that disturbances in the goods  market are often 
the proximate determinant of the current account and real exchange rate. 
In the short run, a goods market disturbance, such as a decline in price 
competitiveness, would move the current account; eventually that move 
would be reversed by the long-run movement in the real exchange rate, 
which Sachs has conceded would result from changed competitiveness. 
Lawrence found that this chain of causation provided a convincing ex- 
planation for the recent behavior of the U.S. current account. 
Dornbusch and George von Furstenberg questioned Sachs' investment 
measures for the LCDs. Dornbusch noted that both military expenditures 
and housing are counted as investment in the national income accounts 
of many LDCs but that they are of little value in servicing or repaying 
debt. By narrowing the definition of investment, Sachs could sharpen his 
tests of  the importance of investment in reducing default risk and the 
difficulties of  financing a  deficit. Von  Furstenberg suggested that, for 
some developing countries, the link between measured investment, capital 
imports, and energy prices is direct, but not because of the mechanisms 
Sachs describes. In the case of at least one country all foreign-financed 
expenditures related to the development of export crops and other invest- 
ment projects, including expenditures on energy and fertilizer, are treated 
as investment. As  a result, 50  percent of the additional cost of  energy 
imports resulting from oil price increases are reported as investment. 
Robin  Marris questioned  whether the  balance  of  payments  in  the 
1970s would have looked the same without the oil shock. He noted that 
although it was clear by the late 1960s that the growth rates of certain 
developing countries were accelerating while developed countries were 
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1970s was greater than could be accounted for by the end of the postwar 
investment boom. Marris asserted this slowdown was surely due in part 
to OPEC. He noted that Cooper's argument  that the energy price increases 
should have made investment relatively more attractive in the highly capi- 
talized developed countries came up against the fact that their investment 
was relatively weak. Cooper responded that factors besides oil prices, in- 
cluding macroeconomic policy and various structural changes, may have 
weakened investment demand in developed countries. Franco Modigliani 
added that the savings created by OPEC facilitated rapid LDC develop- 
ment; but those savings were adequate to finance expanded investment in 
the developed countries as well. Instead, LDCs financed the government 
deficits resulting from the policy of fighting inflation with monetary rather 
than fiscal restrictions. Sachs added that the need to recycle OPEC savings 
has created a more favorable attitude toward LDC lending. 
Charles Holt  observed that the OPEC experience raised the aware- 
ness of industrial countries to their vulnerability to supply disruptions of 
all sorts of  primary commodities.  A  natural response was  to  develop 
diversified sources of primary commodity supply, and this may have been 
the stimulus to direct investment in the LDCs by the industrial nations. 